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Saturday, 21 November 2026 · New Delhi

International Relations

India-China: competition, the border, and managing the dragon

A 3,488-km disputed border, a $100-billion-plus trade deficit and a rivalry that shapes Asia: how India manages competition with China across the LAC, the economy, water and the neighbourhood.

By Sujit27 September 2026Updated 21 November 202622 min readintermediate
India-China: competition, the border, and managing the dragon | UPSC

India-China is the relationship New Delhi watches most closely and trusts least. The two countries share a 3,488-km Line of Actual Control that remains undefined and disputed, a trade deficit that has crossed $100 billion, and rival visions of Asia's future. As S. Jaishankar has put it, managing China demands realism, agility and strategic clarity. The border is the prerequisite: until the LAC stabilises, nothing else in the relationship moves freely.

Few bilaterals compress the whole GS-II syllabus the way this one does: boundary management through layered agreements, economic de-risking without full decoupling, water security, the China-Pakistan nexus, and multilateral coexistence in Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). What follows maps the competition, the slow thaw since the October 2024 patrolling agreement, and India's playbook.

The long arc: Panchsheel to the LAC

India was the first non-socialist country to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, on 1 April 1950. The 1954 Panchsheel Agreement codified five principles: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. The 1962 border war shattered that framework, and it was Rajiv Gandhi's 1988 visit to Beijing that reopened the relationship.

The 1990s and 2000s built a scaffolding of border agreements: the 1993 pact on maintaining peace and tranquility along the LAC, the 1996 confidence-building measures, the 2005 protocol on modalities for implementing them, and the 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement. Each agreement managed the border without settling it, which is why every standoff since has been handled inside a framework designed for management, not resolution.

The boundary question, sector by sector

The western sector in Ladakh is the hardest. India follows the Johnson Line of 1865, which places Aksai Chin inside India; China follows the Macartney-McDonald Line of 1899 and has controlled Aksai Chin since 1962, occupying 38,000 sq km. The middle sector, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, is largely undisputed, with shared maps and basic agreement. The eastern sector runs along the McMahon Line drawn at the 1914 Simla Convention, which China rejects while claiming all of Arunachal Pradesh, around 90,000 sq km, as 'South Tibet'.

On the ground, the pattern is what analysts call salami slicing: dual-use border villages, roads and surveillance infrastructure that alter facts incrementally without triggering war. Friction points such as the Depsang Plains have stayed unresolved for years, and both sides now keep large permanent troop deployments facing each other across buffer zones created after the 2020-23 disengagement rounds.

The LAC: three sectors, one unsettled lineDepsang, GalwanLadakhDoklamTawangThe three sectorsWestern: LadakhAksai Chin (38,000 sq km)Depsang, Galwan friction pointsMiddle: Himachal, UttarakhandLargely undisputed, maps sharedEastern: Sikkim, ArunachalMcMahon Line, rejected by BeijingTawang; Doklam tri-junctionTotal about 3,488 km. India follows theJohnson Line (1865) in the west; China theMacartney-McDonald Line.Schematic, not to scale
The LAC runs about 3,488 km across three sectors. The western sector in Ladakh holds Aksai Chin, where China occupies 38,000 sq km, plus the friction points Depsang and Galwan. The middle sector, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, is largely undisputed with shared maps. The eastern sector follows the McMahon Line through Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, with the Doklam tri-junction nearby. Schematic, not to scale.
1962Border warSino-Indian war; relations freeze for decades1988Rajiv visitPM visit breaks the ice; border talks begin1993Peace agreementsLAC peace and tranquillity agreements signed2017Doklam standoff73-day faceoff at the Bhutan tri-junction2020Galwan clashDeadly clash; ties hit a generational low2024DisengagementPatrolling pact; gradual normalisation begins
Competition and the border: from 1962 to the Galwan reset.
$100B+Trade deficitheavily in China favour3,488 kmLine of Actual Controlundemarcated border2020Galwan clash20 Indian soldiers killedBRI vs IMECCompeting corridorsconnectivity rivalryBRICS, SCOShared forumscooperation amid rivalry
Competition, the border, and managing the dragon: key numbers.

Galwan and the slow thaw since 2024

The June 2020 Galwan clash ended the old normal of an un-demarcated but peaceful border. Disengagement at several friction points created buffer zones in Galwan, Gogra-Hot Springs and Pangong Tso, but Depsang and Demchok stayed frozen. The October 2024 patrolling agreement, reached on the sidelines of the Kazan BRICS summit, restored patrolling rights in those two areas to the pre-April 2020 status quo, the first genuine thaw in four years.

2025 built on it cautiously: a buffer-zone review mechanism, the 23rd round of Special Representatives' talks, and an agreed vocabulary, the '3Ds' of disengagement, de-escalation and de-induction, plus the 'three mutuals' of mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interest. Practical steps were announced alongside: resuming data-sharing on transboundary rivers and restarting the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra. The thaw is management, not settlement, and both armies remain forward-deployed.

The economic knot

The trade deficit is the relationship's other structural fact: it has crossed $100 billion, driven by Indian imports of electronics, active pharmaceutical ingredients, machinery and solar panels. By one compilation, over 98 per cent of India's imports from China are industrial goods, which makes Indian manufacturing vulnerable to supply shocks and weakens Delhi's bargaining power. Indian IT and pharma firms, meanwhile, face opaque regulatory barriers in the Chinese market.

India's response has been de-risking rather than decoupling. Investment screening for land-border countries, production-linked incentives for domestic manufacturing, and restrictions on Chinese vendors in telecom and power all aim to reduce dependence without severing a trade relationship that Indian industry still needs. The result is an uneasy equilibrium: strategic rivalry above, commercial interdependence below.

Water, CPEC and the neighbourhood

There is no water-sharing treaty between the two countries, and China stopped sharing Brahmaputra hydrological data after the 2017 Doklam standoff. Beijing's plan for a mega-dam in Medog county, near Arunachal Pradesh, gives upstream control a strategic edge that Delhi reads as potential leverage. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a $62 billion project running from Kashgar to Gwadar through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, violates India's sovereignty claim directly, while the String of Pearls network, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Gwadar in Pakistan, Kyaukphyu in Myanmar, rings India's maritime approaches.

Multilaterally, China has used its weight to block India's rise: opposing permanent UN Security Council membership, blocking Nuclear Suppliers Group entry on NPT grounds, and repeatedly shielding Pakistan-based terrorists from UN sanctions until the Masood Azhar listing in 2019. India has answered by boycotting every Belt and Road Forum since 2017 and projecting alternatives such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor.

Managing the dragon: India's playbook

The playbook has four tracks. Militarily, India has closed the border-infrastructure gap with all-weather roads, tunnels, the Vibrant Villages programme and rapid mobilisation capacity, while upgrading the Andaman and Nicobar Command to watch Chinese research and survey vessels. Diplomatically, the Quad and supply-chain initiatives with Japan and Australia build coalitions without a formal alliance. Economically, de-risking continues. And multilaterally, India engages China inside BRICS and the SCO, using those forums to insist on sovereignty language, as at the 2025 Tianjin SCO summit.

The through-line is what Jaishankar calls strategic clarity: compete where China coerces, cooperate where interests overlap, and never let the border's temperature dictate the entire relationship. Seventy-five years after 1950, the 'dragon-elephant tango' that Beijing has proposed remains an aspiration, not a description.

The border agreements and the Sela Tunnel moment

A 2024 flashpoint showed how infrastructure has become the language of the dispute: China protested Prime Minister Modi's visit to Arunachal Pradesh to inaugurate the Sela Tunnel at 13,000 feet, which China claims as 'South Tibet' or Zangnan. India rejected the claim, reaffirming Arunachal Pradesh as an integral part of the country.

The BRI was launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. To connect Asia with Europe and Africa, through a network of railways, highways, ports, airports, and other infrastructure projects with the intent to promote trade, investment, and economic growth in participating countries. India opposes it because the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

The boundary has its own paper trail, worth memorizing as a sequence: the 1993 Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement, the 1996 Agreement on Military Confidence-Building Measures along the LAC, the 2005 Modalities for Implementing Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field, the 2012 agreement establishing a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC), and the 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA).

The vocabulary of the rivalry: the 'Five Finger Policy' framing of China's Tibet-centered territorial approach; 'salami slicing', the incremental encroachments (including hundreds of border villages in Tibet) used to assert claims; and 'hometown diplomacy', the two informal summits at Wuhan and Chennai. On the law of the sea, China rejects the 2016 UNCLOS tribunal ruling in the Philippines case, which India upholds as the basis for a rules-based order.

The LAC paper trail

Year

Instrument

1993

Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement

1996

Agreement on Military Confidence-Building Measures along the LAC

2005

Modalities for Implementing Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field

2012

Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC)

2013

Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA)

What examiners keep asking

  • Always separate management from resolution: every border agreement since 1993 manages the LAC; none settles it.
  • For economy questions, use the de-risking frame: dependence is the fact, decoupling is not the policy.
  • Link the neighbourhood to the border: CPEC, the String of Pearls and the Brahmaputra dam are one encirclement argument.

The South China Sea: India's stake in a distant sea

South China Sea is the semi-enclosed sea ringed by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan, through which a large share of India's eastbound trade sails after transiting the Strait of Malacca. India claims nothing there, but its stakes are threefold: freedom of navigation for its commerce, energy assets through ONGC Videsh's exploration blocks off Vietnam, and the credibility of the rules-based order it preaches in the Indo-Pacific.

India's position is legalist: disputes must be settled peacefully under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a formulation that backs the 2016 arbitral award against China's nine-dash line without India firing a rhetorical shot at Beijing. The operational layer is the Act East navy: port calls, the ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise held in the South China Sea, and defence exports like the BrahMos missiles sold to the Philippines, which put Indian hardware on the sea's contested edge.

The limits are geographic and economic. The South China Sea is a distant theatre where India cannot sustain presence the way the US or even Japan can, and the $100-billion-plus China trade relationship disciplines how loudly New Delhi speaks. So India works through ASEAN-led forums, the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, letting Southeast Asian claimants lead while it supplies the legal and naval grammar.

The 'Necklace of Diamonds': countering encirclement

Necklace of Diamonds is the informal name for India's counter to China's String of Pearls: a lattice of access arrangements, logistics agreements and partnerships strung around China's maritime periphery, from the Persian Gulf to the western Pacific. Where the String of Pearls describes Chinese-built or -accessed ports from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean (Hambantota, Gwadar, Djibouti), the Necklace describes India's answer in kind: not bases, which Indian doctrine avoids, but assured access.

The sourced nodes include Duqm in Oman, where India has secured military and logistics access guarding the Strait of Hormuz's western approaches, and Chabahar in Iran, the gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia. The lattice extends through logistics pacts and exercises with Indo-Pacific partners, supporting the SAGAR and MAHASAGAR maritime doctrines. The honest caveat: it is an asymmetric answer, India's resources are a fraction of China's, and every node depends on a partner's domestic politics, which is why the Necklace is a hedging device, not a containment architecture.

The String of Pearls around IndiaINDIAGwadarHambantotaKyaukphyuDjiboutiStrait of HormuzStrait of MalaccaDashed line: the pearls chain. Black diamonds: chokepoints on the energy route.Schematic, not to scale
The String of Pearls describes Chinese-built or accessed ports from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean: Hambantota, Gwadar, Kyaukphyu and Djibouti ring India's maritime approaches. Gwadar, near the Strait of Hormuz, gives China an Arabian Sea outlet and an alternative to the Malacca route for energy imports. India's answer is the Necklace of Diamonds: assured access, not bases. Schematic, not to scale.

Freedom of navigation: the American programme that shapes the seas

The freedom-of-navigation programme is an American initiative, begun in March 1979 while the negotiations that produced the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea were still under way. Its purpose is to defend navigation, overflight and other lawful uses of the sea against what Washington regards as excessive maritime claims by coastal states: claims that go beyond what the law of the sea allows.

The programme matters for India even though India takes no part in it. India claims nothing in the South China Sea, but its commerce sails through it, and the principles the programme defends, that sea lanes stay open and coastal claims stay within the law, underpin India's own position on the waters it depends on.

Asaphila and Taksing: two villages on the Upper Subansiri frontier

Asaphila and Taksing are two remote settlements in Upper Subansiri district of Arunachal Pradesh, close to the Line of Actual Control. They entered the news when Chinese troops were reported pitching tents in the area, a reminder that the eastern sector of the boundary is not a settled line but a lived frontier, where patrols and local presence decide the facts on the ground.

The episode also illustrates the naming dispute that runs through the whole boundary question. Beijing calls Arunachal Pradesh by the name Zangnan and treats it as South Tibet, a claim India rejects outright. For examiners, Asaphila and Taksing are a test of map literacy: knowing the district, the state and the sector matters more than the incident itself.

Key Terms

  • Line of Actual Control: The Line of Actual Control is the de facto, undemarcated boundary between India and China, running about 3,488 km from Ladakh through Uttarakhand and Sikkim to Arunachal Pradesh. Unlike a settled border, its exact alignment is disputed in the western (Aksai Chin), middle, and eastern (McMahon Line) sectors. It is central to GS-2 and GS-3 questions on border management, the 2020 standoff, and India-China relations. The Galwan Valley clash of June 2020
  • De-risking: De-risking is the strategy of reducing economic dependence on a single country, chiefly China, without full decoupling: diversifying supply chains, markets, and critical inputs to limit coercive leverage. The term entered policy discourse through European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in 2023. For UPSC it frames questions on economic security, critical minerals, and supply-chain resilience in IR. The European Union's 2023 Economic Security Strategy, which framed relations with China as de-risking rather than decoupling.
  • Aksai Chin: Aksai Chin is a high-altitude plateau in eastern Ladakh, currently administered by China but claimed by India. The dispute stems from differing colonial-era boundary lines, with the Johnson Line placing it in India, and China's construction of the Western Highway through it in the 1950s became a flashpoint of the 1962 Sino-Indian War. It matters for UPSC because it is central to GS-2 and GS-3 questions on the Line of Actual Control, border infrastructure, and India-China relations. China's construction of the Aksai Chin highway (G219) linking Xinjiang and Tibet in the 1950s, which revealed Beijing's control of the plateau.
  • Depsang: Depsang is the high-altitude plain in eastern Ladakh near the Line of Actual Control with China, lying close to the strategic Daulat Beg Oldi sector and the Karakoram Pass. It saw a Chinese incursion in 2013 and renewed tensions during the 2020 Ladakh standoff. For UPSC it matters for India-China border questions, the geography of Ladakh, the role of the DSDBO road, and the disengagement and buffer-zone arrangements negotiated after 2020. The 2013 Depsang standoff, when Chinese troops pitched tents 19 km inside the Indian perception of the LAC, ended after three weeks of flag meetings.
  • Demchok: is the disputed border area in eastern Ladakh along the Line of Actual Control, where differing Indian and Chinese perceptions of the LAC have produced recurring standoffs over grazing and patrolling rights. It featured in the 2024 disengagement understanding alongside Depsang. For UPSC it is a current-affairs anchor for India-China border questions in GS-2 and GS-3. The October 2024 disengagement understanding covered Demchok and Depsang
  • Galwan: Galwan refers to the Galwan Valley in eastern Ladakh, site of the deadly India-China clash of 15-16 June 2020, the first combat fatalities on the Line of Actual Control in 45 years. Twenty Indian soldiers, including Colonel Santosh Babu, died in hand-to-hand fighting after Chinese troops violated disengagement understandings; China later acknowledged its own casualties. The clash triggered standoffs across eastern Ladakh and a reset of bilateral ties. For UPSC it anchors questions on the LAC and India-China relations. India's June 2020 ban on 59 Chinese apps including TikTok, an immediate response to the clash.
  • CPEC: The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is the flagship corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative, linking Gwadar port in Balochistan to Kashgar in Xinjiang through energy, road, rail, and special economic zone projects. It traverses Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which is why India opposes it on sovereignty grounds. For UPSC, CPEC illustrates the BRI's strategic geography and India's concerns over the China-Pakistan axis. India's consistent diplomatic objection to CPEC on the ground that it passes through territory India claims in Jammu and Kashmir
  • String of Pearls: The String of Pearls is a term for China's alleged network of ports and facilities across the Indian Ocean that could encircle India, from Gwadar in Pakistan to Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Kyaukphyu in Myanmar. Indian analysts use it to describe Beijing's maritime presence and dual-use infrastructure. For UPSC, it is a core IR concept for answers on India-China rivalry, maritime security and the Indo-Pacific. Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, leased to a Chinese firm for 99 years in 2017
  • Panchsheel: Panchsheel is the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence signed by India and China on 29 April 1954 as part of their agreement on trade with the Tibet region. The principles are mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference, equality and peaceful coexistence. Echoed at the 1955 Bandung Conference, they became the moral vocabulary of the Non-Aligned Movement. For UPSC, Panchsheel is the GS-2 touchstone for India-China relations and peaceful-coexistence doctrine. The 29 April 1954 Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India, whose preamble enshrined the five principles.
  • McMahon Line: The McMahon Line is the boundary demarcated in 1914 between British India and Tibet at the Simla Convention by Sir Henry McMahon, which India treats as its legal border with China in the eastern sector, placing Arunachal Pradesh within India. China has never accepted it and claims the area as South Tibet. For UPSC it is central to the India-China boundary dispute, the 1962 war, and questions on the Line of Actual Control. Combat in the eastern sector during the 1962 war centred on territory south of the line, including Tawang.
  • Salami slicing: Salami slicing is a strategy of achieving a large objective through a series of small, individually deniable steps, each too minor to provoke a strong response. The term comes from 'salami tactics' attributed to Hungarian communist leader Matyas Rakosi in the 1940s; in international relations it describes grey-zone coercion, including incremental territorial moves. It serves GS-2 IR and GS-3 security questions on coercion below the threshold of war. Matyas Rakosi's salami tactics, Hungary (1940s)
  • Doklam: Doklam is a plateau at the Bhutan-China-India trijunction, claimed by Bhutan, where a 73-day military standoff between India and China occurred in 2017 after Chinese road-building in the area. Indian troops intervened at Bhutan's request, and the standoff ended through diplomacy without firing. For UPSC, it illustrates the LAC-adjacent security dynamic and India's role in Bhutan's security. The 73-day standoff from June to August 2017, resolved diplomatically at the trijunction.
  • Debt-trap: Debt-trap is the allegation that a lender extends unsustainable credit to a borrowing country to extract strategic concessions, such as ports or votes, when repayment fails. The charge is most associated with criticism of Chinese infrastructure lending under the Belt and Road Initiative. It matters for UPSC international relations as a lens on Indian Ocean geopolitics and sovereignty debates. Sri Lanka's Hambantota port, leased to a Chinese company for 99 years in 2017 after the country struggled to service construction debt.
  • Zangnan: China's name for Arunachal Pradesh, claimed as 'South Tibet'.
  • WMCC: The Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs, established 2012.

Practice questions

0 of 5 answered · 0 correct

Q1Prelims practice

The Panchsheel Agreement of 1954 was signed between India and China. Which of the following is NOT one of its five principles?

Q2Prelims practice

Which one of the following pairs is correctly matched?

Q3Prelims practice

The 1993 Agreement between India and China is best described as:

Q4Prelims practice

The 'String of Pearls' strategy of China refers to:

Q5Prelims practice

Consider the following statements:

  1. The October 2024 patrolling agreement restored patrolling rights in Depsang Plains and Demchok.
  2. India and China have a bilateral water-sharing treaty for the Brahmaputra.
  3. China blocked the UN listing of Masood Azhar as a global terrorist until 2019.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

Mains Practice question

Q. The unresolved boundary question remains the central determinant of India-China relations, but the relationship cannot be reduced to the border alone. Discuss. (250 words)

Framing hintStructure the answer as a competition-cooperation matrix: border, economy, water, neighbourhood, multilateralism. Use the post-Galwan timeline (2020 clash, buffer zones, the October 2024 patrolling agreement, the 2025 3Ds) to show management without resolution. Conclude with the strategic-clarity thesis: deterrence plus de-risking plus selective engagement.

Related GS-II themes from the PYQ bank: India's China policy across the boundary dispute, trade dependence and Indo-Pacific balancing.

Frequently asked questions

How long is the LAC, and why is it disputed?

The Line of Actual Control runs about 3,488 km across three sectors and has never been demarcated or delineated. India and China follow different claimed lines in the western (Johnson vs Macartney-McDonald) and eastern (McMahon, rejected by Beijing) sectors, so the line itself is the dispute.

What did the October 2024 patrolling agreement change?

Reached on the sidelines of the Kazan BRICS summit, it restored Indian and Chinese patrolling rights in the Depsang Plains and Demchok to the pre-April 2020 status quo. It was the first genuine thaw since the Galwan clash, though buffer zones elsewhere remain.

Why does India oppose the BRI and CPEC?

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which India claims, so endorsing the BRI would imply accepting a sovereignty violation. India also cites opaque financing, debt-trap risks for neighbours, and strategic encirclement through the String of Pearls.

What are the '3Ds' in India-China border talks?

Disengagement, de-escalation and de-induction: the phased vocabulary agreed in 2025 for stepping back from the LAC confrontation, paired with the 'three mutuals' of mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interest.

How large is the India-China trade deficit, and why does it matter?

The deficit has crossed $100 billion, driven by imports of electronics, APIs, machinery and solar panels. Because the imports are overwhelmingly industrial goods, Indian manufacturing is exposed to supply shocks and Delhi's bargaining power is weakened, which is why the policy response is de-risking rather than decoupling.

India launches e-B-4 Business Visa

In January 2026 India introduced a new e-Production Investment Business Visa (e-B-4) for Chinese nationals. The new system allows eligible professionals to complete the entire visa process online, eliminating the need to visit Indian embassies or consulates. The design is the story: a fully online business-visa route for the nationals of the country that is both India's largest trading partner and its most sensitive bilateral relationship, aimed at production and investment-linked travel rather than tourism.

For prelims, the visa's name and code (e-B-4), its target group (Chinese nationals) and the fully-online process are the recall facts. For mains, the item is a compact example of how visa policy is used as an economic instrument — easing the movement of professionals tied to production and investment while keeping the process itself entirely digital and therefore traceable — and it sits naturally in answers on India–China economic engagement and on digital governance.

China's CR450: World's Fastest Bullet Train Unveiled

China has shown off the CR450, the world's fastest bullet train, which reached a record 453 kilometres per hour during testing. With it, China moved past all global competitors in both speed and efficiency. China runs the world's largest high-speed rail network, spanning 50,000 kilometres and linking almost all major cities. The CR450 cements China's leadership in rail innovation and export, supporting global projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The numbers are the story here: a 453-kilometre-per-hour test speed is not a marginal improvement on existing high-speed rail but a step into a different performance band, and a 50,000-kilometre network is the infrastructure base that makes such a train commercially meaningful rather than a laboratory exhibit. High-speed rail has become one of the clearest arenas of technological competition between major economies — China builds and exports it, Japan and European manufacturers defend their own systems, and India is building its first high-speed corridor with foreign technology. A train that goes faster matters less for the record itself than for what it signals: the ability to design, test and manufacture at the frontier, and to sell that capability abroad as part of a wider infrastructure offer. For prelims, the train's name, the 453 km/h testing speed and the 50,000 km network figure are the recall facts; for mains, the CR450 is a case study in industrial policy — how sustained state investment in one sector produces both domestic connectivity and an export product that carries political influence with it.

IRIndia ChinaChinaupsc-prelimsgs-paper-2GS2 18explained

Asked in the mains

Previous-year questions from this topic

How UPSC has actually asked this topic — with the year and marks for each question.

  1. 202410 marks

    “The West is fostering India as an alternative to reduce dependence on China’s supply chain and as a strategy to counter China’s political and economic dominance.” Explain this statement with examples.

  2. 202110 marks

    “The USA is facing an existential threat in the form of China that is much more challenging than the erstwhile Soviet Union.” Explain.

  3. 201710 marks

    ‘China is using its economic relations and positive trade surplus as tools to develop potential military power status in Asia’, In the light of this statement, discuss its impact on India as her neighbor.

  4. 202115 marks

    The newly tri-nation partnership AUKUS is aimed at countering China’s ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region. Is it going to supersede the existing partnership in the region? Discuss the strength and impact of AUKUS in the present scenario.

  5. 202615 marks

    "China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has transformed South Asia from a regional space into a theatre of great power competition." Analyse the strategic implications of the BRI for India's security and regional influence in South Asia.

  6. 202110 marks

    “The USA is facing an existential threat in the form of a China, that is much more challenging than the erstwhile Soviet Union.” Explain.

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