India-Russia: the tested friendship in a changing order

No great power has stood by India longer than Russia. Soviet backing through the Cold War, the defence relationship that still equips much of India's military, and the 'special and privileged strategic partnership' declared in 2010 make Moscow the constant in India's foreign policy. As PM Modi has said, India gives top priority to its relations with Russia in a rapidly changing world.

The examination angle is balance: India signs foundational defence pacts with the United States while buying Russian oil at a discount, abstains on Ukraine resolutions while preaching the UN Charter, and watches Moscow's 'no-limits' embrace of Beijing. What follows maps the pillars that hold the partnership up and the strains pulling at it.

A friendship tested by history

The partnership's roots are Soviet: Moscow backed India diplomatically through the Cold War, launched India's first satellite Aryabhata in 1975, and became the supplier of choice for Indian defence. The relationship was elevated to a 'special and privileged strategic partnership' in 2010, and the annual summit mechanism has kept the leadership dialogue uninterrupted through every global crisis since. Russia backs India's permanent UN Security Council candidature and its Nuclear Suppliers Group membership, support that costs Moscow little and buys Delhi much.

The people-to-people layer is thinner than the strategic one but growing: over 15,000 Indian students, mostly in medicine, study in Russian universities, and 2025 was observed as the India-Russia Year of Culture. What sustains the partnership is not sentiment but utility: Russia offers India strategic autonomy, a reliable partner that lets Delhi balance its growing ties with the West without joining any bloc.

Defence: the enduring core

Russia remains India's largest defence partner, though the data tells the story of diversification: Moscow's share of Indian arms imports has dropped from about 70 per cent to under 45 per cent in a decade. The inventory is still Russian at its core: S-400 Triumf air-defence systems, the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, the jointly developed BrahMos missile, and AK-203 rifles being made in India. Exercises INDRA and Avi-INDRA keep the militaries interoperable, and joint production under Make in India is the stated direction.

Newer markers show the relationship adapting: negotiations for leasing a third Akula-class nuclear attack submarine (Chakra-III) have been reported as finalised, and a reciprocal logistics agreement (RELOS) has been reported as operational, on the lines of the logistics pacts India holds with the US, France and others. The Ukraine war has strained Russia's defence industry, and delivery delays, including on the final S-400 squadrons, are now a standing Indian complaint.

Energy: the oil pivot

The Ukraine war rewrote the trade relationship overnight. Discounted Russian crude now accounts for about 36 per cent of India's oil imports, making Russia India's top supplier, and Indian refiners have become central to the global flows of Russian oil. Russian firms like Rosneft and Gazprom invest downstream in India, while Indian companies hold stakes in Russian fields such as Sakhalin-I and Vankor.

The pivot has a price. The United States has been reported to impose additional tariffs on Indian exports citing the Russian oil purchases, and there are reports of India moderating the intake under Western pressure. Delhi's public line has not changed: energy security for 1.4 billion people is a national interest, not a sanctions question. But the episode shows the new arithmetic: every barrel from Russia is now priced in Washington as well as Moscow.

The new economic agenda: trade, rupees and connectivity

Bilateral trade hit $68.7 billion in FY 2024-25, but the structure is lopsided: Indian exports are stuck near $5 billion, mostly pharmaceuticals, against massive crude and fertilizer imports. Settlement is increasingly in national currencies, with rupee-rouble arrangements reported to bypass dollar channels for the bulk of trade, though surplus rupees stuck in Indian banks (the special vostro account issue) show the plumbing is incomplete. Leaders have endorsed an announced goal of $100 billion in trade by 2030, alongside talks on a bilateral investment treaty and an India-Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) free trade agreement.

Connectivity is the long game. The International North-South Transport Corridor offers a route to Europe about 40 per cent shorter than Suez, bypassing Pakistan; the Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor became operational in 2024, cutting transit time from 40 to 24 days. Under the Act Far East policy, India extended a $1 billion line of credit for Russia's Far East and shows up at the Eastern Economic Forum. Fertilizer security, long-term potash and phosphate contracts, quietly anchors the farm economy to the partnership.

The multilateral and technology layer

Russia is India's partner of choice for multipolarity: BRICS, the SCO and the RIC trilateral are the forums where both preach a non-Western order, and Moscow's UNSC veto is a standing Indian asset. The technology layer runs from Kudankulam, India's only nuclear power project with foreign collaboration, with a roadmap for more reactors under IAEA safeguards, to space: Gaganyaan astronauts trained in Russia, and reciprocal GLONASS-NavIC ground stations under discussion.

The St. Petersburg Declaration on joint Arctic hydrocarbon exploration points to the next frontier both countries are eyeing: energy and shipping routes opening in the north. For Delhi, the multilateral layer is where the partnership pays without costing: support for its big institutional asks, in exchange for India's refusal to join Western sanctions.

The Arctic: observer status and the 2022 policy

The Arctic Council is the leading intergovernmental forum for Arctic cooperation, set up by the 1996 Ottawa Declaration growing out of the 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. It has 8 Arctic states, 6 indigenous Permanent Participants and 13 observers including India. After the Ukraine conflict, the 'Arctic 7' western members paused cooperation with Russia.

India's stake is threefold: Arctic sea-ice melt is linked to monsoon predictability, the Arctic holds an estimated 13 percent of undiscovered oil and 30 percent of undiscovered gas, and ONGC Videsh eyes Russian Arctic LNG. India's Arctic Policy (2022) gave this a six-pillar framework, and joint engagement with Russia in the Council covers the Northern Sea Route for future energy and shipping routes.

The strains in the relationship

The deepest structural strain is Moscow's 'no-limits' partnership with Beijing, which limits Russian neutrality in any future Sino-Indian clash and has produced joint Russia-China patrols uncomfortably close to Japan. India's deepening US ties compound the wariness: Washington's foundational pacts (LEMOA, COMCASA, BECA) and the 2008 nuclear deal made the US a rival arms supplier, while Russia's foreign minister has dismissed the Indo-Pacific as an 'artificially imposed construct'.

Then there are the transactional frictions: defence delivery delays, the trade imbalance and payment tangles, and India's principled abstention on Ukraine resolutions at the UNGA, advocating dialogue and the UN Charter without condemning Moscow. The partnership survives because both sides price these strains as manageable. The exam question is whether that pricing holds as the Russia-China embrace tightens.

Consulates, mobility and payment rails

The 22nd Annual Summit in July 2024 set the forward agenda: a $100 billion trade target by 2030, promotion of bilateral trade in national currencies, and new Indian consulates in Kazan and Yekaterinburg to serve the growing Indian community. A record $68.7 billion in bilateral trade in FY25 gave the 'Programme 2030' target its base, alongside a long-term LNG infrastructure pact and Russian offers of VVER-1200 reactors, small modular reactors and floating nuclear plants.

The people-and-payments layer: a landmark Safe Mobility Pact to safely regulate the mobility of 500,000 Indian skilled and semi-skilled workers, preventing exploitation in conflict zones; a free 30-day e-tourist visa for Russian citizens; and a proposal to integrate India's UPI with Russia's MIR payment system to bypass SWIFT. Russia has also adopted the framework to join the International Big Cat Alliance (IBCA).

India-Russia at a glance

What examiners keep asking

• Frame Russia as the strategic-autonomy argument: the partner that lets India say no to the West.
• For defence questions, use the diversification thesis: falling share, enduring core, joint production as the future.
• The oil pivot is the standard 'interests vs values' answer: energy security framed as national interest.

Key Terms

• International Big Cat Alliance (IBCA): India-led conservation alliance whose membership framework Russia has adopted.
• International North-South Transport Corridor: The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is the 7,200-km multi-modal route connecting India with Russia and Europe via Iran, using the ports of Mumbai and Bandar Abbas with rail and road links through Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Conceived in the 2000 India-Iran-Russia agreement and operationalised through trial shipments, it bypasses the Suez Canal. For UPSC, it is India's answer to Eurasian connectivity constraints. Chabahar port is integrated into the corridor as India's gateway to Iran.
• The Arctic Council is: The Arctic Council is the intergovernmental forum established by the 1996 Ottawa Declaration to promote cooperation on Arctic environmental protection and sustainable development. Its eight member states are the Arctic littoral countries, joined by six indigenous Permanent Participants and observers including India, which gained observer status in 2013. The chairmanship rotates among members. For UPSC, it is a standard GS-2 and GS-3 prelims fact on polar governance and India's Arctic interests. India becoming an observer in 2013
• bilateral investment treaty: Bilateral investment treaty (BIT) is an agreement between two countries setting out protections for investors, such as fair and equitable treatment, protection from expropriation, and investor-state dispute settlement. India terminated most of its old BITs and adopted a new Model BIT in 2016 restricting investor-state arbitration. For UPSC GS-2 and GS-3, BITs link foreign investment, trade policy, and sovereignty debates. India's Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 2016
• Nuclear Suppliers Group: The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a 48-member export-control regime that coordinates controls on civilian nuclear material, equipment, and dual-use technology to prevent weapons proliferation. Formed in response to India's 1974 nuclear test, it first met in London in November 1975. For UPSC, the NSG matters because India, a non-NPT state, won a 2008 waiver enabling civilian nuclear trade but remains blocked from membership, largely by China. The Indo-US civil nuclear deal of 2008 led directly to the NSG's waiver for India, opening global uranium supplies for India's reactors.
• Safe Mobility Pact: The India-Russia agreement to safely regulate the mobility of 500,000 Indian skilled and semi-skilled workers.
• Strategic Partnership: Strategic Partnership is the highest tier of bilateral relationship short of a formal alliance, signalling long-term convergence across defence, trade, technology and diplomacy. It is institutionalised through regular summits, joint commissions and framework agreements that structure cooperation. For UPSC, the term is GS-2 shorthand for mapping India's priority relationships, since New Delhi uses it to designate partners central to its multi-aligned foreign policy. The India-US Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership, designated during the 2020 presidential visit.
• UPI-MIR integration: The proposed linkage of India's UPI with Russia's MIR payments to bypass SWIFT for bilateral trade.
• strategic autonomy: Strategic autonomy is India's foreign-policy doctrine of retaining independent decision-making and avoiding binding military alliances. Rooted in the Non-Aligned Movement, it evolved into multi-alignment: partnering with different powers on different issues, from defence to energy to technology. For UPSC, it is the master key to GS-2 answers on India's ties with the US, Russia and China, explaining how New Delhi balances competing pressures without choosing a camp. India's continued purchase of Russian crude oil and the S-400 air-defence system despite Western sanctions pressure.
• Security Council: Security Council is the United Nations' principal organ for maintaining international peace and security, established under the UN Charter in 1945. It has 15 members: five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) wielding veto power, and ten elected non-permanent members serving two-year terms. Its resolutions are legally binding. For UPSC, it is the focal point of GS-2 questions on India's campaign for a permanent seat and UNSC reform. India's election as a non-permanent member for the 2021-22 term.
• Programme 2030: The India-Russia roadmap targeting $100 billion in bilateral trade by 2030.
• Arctic Policy: India's Arctic Policy, unveiled on 17 March 2022 as 'India and the Arctic: building a partnership for sustainable development', is India's first formal policy for the region. It rests on six pillars: scientific research and cooperation, climate and environmental protection, economic and human development, transportation and connectivity, governance and international cooperation, and national capacity building. UPSC international relations treats it as India's polar diplomacy, linking Arctic melt to the monsoon and Himalayan glaciers. India's Himadri research station at Ny-Alesund in Svalbard, Norway, where India has been an Arctic Council observer since 2013.

Practice questions

The EAEU track: an FTA with Eurasia

Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is the Russia-led economic bloc of five post-Soviet states, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, operating as a customs union with a single market. For India it is the institutional doorway to Eurasian commerce: one negotiation instead of five bilateral ones, covering a market that sits astride the INSTC corridor and holds the energy and minerals India needs.

The track moved in 2025, when India and the EAEU agreed terms to launch free-trade-agreement negotiations, alongside the $100-billion bilateral trade goal with Russia for 2030. The challenges are the sanctions overhang on Russia, rules-of-origin complexity across five economies, and limited export complementarity beyond pharmaceuticals and agriculture. But as a hedge it is valuable: an EAEU agreement would give India's Eurasian engagement a legal and tariff architecture instead of running on political goodwill alone.