International Relations· Prelims · GS-II
Buddhist diplomacy: how India turned an ancient inheritance into a diplomatic asset
Three of Buddhism's four holiest sites lie in India, and New Delhi has used that inheritance as a diplomatic instrument since independence — from Nehru's relic diplomacy to Bodh Gaya's “Mini-Asia” and the quiet rivalry with China and Japan.
When governments stop talking to each other, shared faith often keeps a door open. For India, that door is Buddhism. Three of the four places most sacred to Buddhists — Bodh Gaya, where the Buddha attained enlightenment; Sarnath, where he gave his first sermon; and Kushinagar, where he died — lie on Indian soil. Only Lumbini, his birthplace, sits across the border in Nepal. That geography gives India a standing in the Buddhist world no other country can claim, and since independence New Delhi has treated it as a diplomatic asset: a way to speak to Asia in a language older than any treaty.
An inheritance older than the republic
India’s Buddhist diplomacy did not begin in 1947; it began more than two thousand years earlier, with an emperor. In the third century BCE, Ashoka is said to have opened the original stupas holding the Buddha’s relics and redistributed them among thousands of new stupas across the subcontinent. Monasteries and shrines followed, and by the Gupta period, roughly the fourth to sixth centuries CE, Nalanda had become one of the great centres of learning in the ancient world, joined later by Vallabhi, Vikramashila and Odantapura. Monks and traders then carried the teaching outward — into Central Asia, China, and East and Southeast Asia — so that by independence, Buddhism was already a shared inheritance across much of Asia — the point modern diplomacy exploits: India hosts the tradition’s home, it does not borrow it.
Bodh Gaya sits at the centre of that claim. Buddhists regard it as the navel of their universe, the place where the Buddha attained enlightenment beneath the Bodhi tree. Sarnath and Kushinagar complete the trio on Indian soil, but Bodh Gaya is the one that draws pilgrims, monks and governments alike, and it is there that India’s Buddhist diplomacy has its headquarters.
The Nehru years: Buddhism becomes diplomacy
In the years after independence, Jawaharlal Nehru reached for Buddhism as a way to connect with Asia’s newly independent nations. He called it India’s great gift to the world, a phrase he returned to often in diplomatic settings, the argument being that countries sharing a Buddhist past could talk as civilisational equals. Buddhist monks became instruments of that policy — scholars and teachers such as Bhikshu Jagdish Kashyap were sent abroad as special envoys, carrying Indian goodwill in a form no trade delegation could match.
Relics were the other instrument. In 1949, the relics of Sariputra and Maudgalyayana, two of the Buddha’s closest disciples, were received from a museum in London at a formal state ceremony attended by diplomats and monks, and then taken on a tour of Buddhist countries including Myanmar, Tibet and Nepal. China, meanwhile, presented India with relics of Xuanzang, the seventh-century Chinese monk who had travelled to India and written about it, and pledged support for a memorial hall in his honour at Nalanda. In each case the past was made to do present-day diplomatic work.
1956 and Bodh Gaya, the “Mini-Asia”
The high point of this early diplomacy was the year-long celebration in 1956 of the 2,500th anniversary of the Buddha’s birth. Festivals, conferences, art exhibitions and diplomatic gatherings filled Bodh Gaya, and delegations from across Asia attended. The scale of the event made it the first great set-piece of Indian cultural diplomacy.
New Delhi moved to make the moment last. In the same year it set up a Bodh Gaya Temple Advisory Board, with representatives from Asian countries, which allotted land to foreign Buddhist organisations for temples, monasteries and rest houses. Over the following decades, China, Tibet, Myanmar, Thailand, Japan, Vietnam, South Korea and Sri Lanka all built at the site. In the 1980s the government went further, allowing each country to build in its own national architectural style — so that a walk through Bodh Gaya became a walk through the Buddhist architecture of Asia. The town earned its nickname: a “Mini-Asia”, a place where several nations had staked a physical claim to a shared heritage.
The Dalai Lama and the Tibet factor
Buddhist diplomacy also has a sharper edge, and it arrived in 1959, when the Dalai Lama, the spiritual head of Tibetan Buddhism, fled Tibet and India gave him refuge. Tibetan refugees were allowed to form a government-in-exile headquartered at McLeodganj, near Dharamshala in Himachal Pradesh, and India became the centre of the Tibetan Buddhist world in exile. The Dalai Lama’s global stature, and ceremonies he conducts such as the Kalachakra initiation, have kept India at the centre of the Buddhist map. But the same hospitality has been a constant irritant in relations with China. Hosting the Dalai Lama is the clearest example of how Buddhist diplomacy can both raise India’s standing and complicate its most important bilateral relationship at the same time.
China’s rival Buddhist diplomacy
China has not left the field to India. Beijing runs an assertive Buddhist diplomacy of its own, built on the claim that China played the larger role in carrying Buddhism to East and Southeast Asia — and even to the Americas. Its presence at Bodh Gaya is substantial: it donated relics and texts for the Xuanzang Memorial Hall, completed in 1984, along with an endowment to maintain it. Temple-building, donations of images and artefacts, and Buddhist networks abroad are all part of the same effort.
The most sensitive part of China’s approach concerns the succession of the Dalai Lama. Beijing has tried to promote an alternative claimant, a move aimed at shifting the centre of Tibetan Buddhist authority away from Dharamshala and toward institutions it controls. The contest is not only about theology; it is about who gets to speak for the world’s Tibetan Buddhists, and therefore about whose version of Buddhist history Asia accepts.
Japan’s quieter, deeper engagement
Japan’s engagement is quieter but, by one measure, the deepest of any foreign country’s. Japanese organisations have built temples at Bodh Gaya and at Sarnath, and the giant Buddha statue that dominates Bodh Gaya was raised by the Daijokyo sect. Peace pagodas across India trace back to the peace movement of the monk Nichidatsu Fujii. Japan has also funded conservation of Buddhist sites through the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, paying to preserve heritage others merely visit.
The contrast with China is instructive. Where Beijing’s Buddhist diplomacy is state-directed and openly competitive, Tokyo’s has grown through religious organisations and development assistance, and it aligns closely with India’s own interests. That is one reason the India–Japan relationship has a cultural depth that survives changes of government in both capitals.
Why Buddhism works when politics stalls
The argument for Buddhist diplomacy is that it operates on a different clock from ordinary foreign policy. Governments change, border disputes flare, trade talks collapse — but a pilgrim route, a temple built in a national style, or a relic returned after 127 years in exile keeps its meaning. Relic diplomacy illustrates the point: when sacred objects taken during colonial rule return to India, as the Piprahwa relics did from Hong Kong in 2025, the homecoming becomes an event other governments can join without conceding anything. Mobile exhibitions and cultural programmes built around such objects function as a form of Track Two diplomacy — contact between societies when contact between governments is difficult.
The same logic applies to the quieter instruments: joint research, scholarships, translation projects and academic exchanges between Buddhist institutions. These do not make headlines, but they build relationships that outlast any single dispute. India cannot convert its Buddhist inheritance into leverage on demand, but it can keep the conversation going when everything else has stopped — and in diplomacy, keeping the conversation going is often the whole game.