Fractured Frontiers: North-East Insurgency and Separatism

The North-East is India's most insurgency-experienced region: eight states, over 140 ethnic groups, and a geography that connects the region to the mainland only through a 22-kilometre-wide corridor. Since the 1950s it has hosted overlapping insurgencies driven by ethnic nationalism, demographic anxiety and the feeling of distance from New Delhi. Today the arc is bending toward peace: the Union Government has set a target of 2029 to end insurgency in the Northeast, violence is at historic lows in most states, and a string of accords from 2015 to 2024 has brought thousands of cadres into the mainstream.

UPSC treats this region as a permanent question bank. The 2025 GS-3 paper asked candidates to map the various peace accords and agreements of the past decade (15 marks), and the 2015 paper asked why armed insurgency survived so long in the region (15 marks). The standard answer structure is state-wise history, then causes, then the peace process, and this article follows exactly that order, closing with the other great separatist movement the syllabus demands: Khalistan.

Three geographical facts anchor everything else. The region comprises Sikkim plus the seven sister states of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura and Meghalaya. It shares borders with five countries: China (Tibet), Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar and Bangladesh, with 99 per cent of its boundary being an international border. And it hangs from the rest of India by the Siliguri Corridor, the 'Chicken's Neck', a strip roughly 22 kilometres wide between Nepal and Bangladesh. Whoever understands this map understands why the insurgencies began, why they lasted, and why ending them required accords rather than only operations.

State by state: the history of insurgency

Each state's insurgency has its own origin story and its own settlement path. The table below is the revision backbone for this topic; the paragraphs after it unpack the two live cases, Nagaland and Manipur.

Two abbreviations in the table need definitions. ULFA, the United Liberation Front of Asom, is the Assamese separatist outfit formed in 1979 demanding a sovereign Assam; its pro-talks faction led by Arabinda Rajkhowa signed the 2023 accord while the anti-talks ULFA(I) faction under Paresh Baruah continues low-level activity from across the Myanmar border. NSCN(IM), the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah faction), is the dominant Naga insurgent group since the 1988 split, in ceasefire since 1997 and party to the 2015 Framework Agreement.

Nagaland is the frozen file. The 2015 Framework Agreement raised hopes of a final settlement, but the core bottleneck is NSCN(IM)'s demand for a separate Naga flag and a separate constitution (the Yehzabo), which the Centre rejects as violating federal sovereignty. Manipur is the live file. Ethnic violence erupted on 3 May 2023 between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities, triggered by a High Court direction on Meitei Scheduled Tribe status and a Tribal Solidarity March; over 260 people were killed and around 60,000 displaced, with the two communities separated by security-manned buffer zones. Chief Minister N. Biren Singh resigned on 9 February 2025, President's Rule was imposed on 13 February 2025, revoked on 4 February 2026, and Yumnam Khemchand Singh was sworn in as Chief Minister. The Kuki-Zo demand for a separate administration remains the central unresolved issue.

Why the frontier burned: the causes

UPSC's 2015 question asked why armed insurgency survived so long here. The causes fall into six clusters:

• Colonial legacy and isolation: British policies such as the Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas, enforced through the Inner Line Regulation, cut tribal communities off from the national mainstream and left a template of separateness.
• Ethnic nationalism: movements seeking self-determination and sovereignty, from the NNC's Greater Nagalim to ULFA's sovereign Assam, built on distinct Tibeto-Burman identities.
• Demographic anxiety: migration from Bangladesh and Nepal altered demographic balances, intensifying fears of cultural marginalisation and resource competition; the Assam Agitation is the archetype.
• Delayed political recognition: slow grants of statehood deepened the feeling of neglect; Manipur waited until 1972.
• Geography and external support: dense forests, hills and porous borders gave insurgents safe havens, while groups such as ULFA and NSCN-K operated from Myanmar and China aided Naga rebels in the 1960s and 1970s.
• Governance deficits: weak administrative reach in remote tribal areas, poor rehabilitation of surrendered militants, and AFSPA-related alienation, symbolised by Irom Sharmila's 16-year hunger strike against the Act in Manipur.

Underneath these clusters sits a socioeconomic engine: poor infrastructure, youth unemployment that turned militancy into a salaried 'industry', and weak private investment deterred by poor connectivity and security fears. Insurgency in the North-East was never only about identity; it was also, for many recruits, a livelihood.

The Chicken's Neck: geography as destiny

The Siliguri Corridor, popularly the Chicken's Neck, is the narrow strip of land, roughly 22 kilometres wide at its slimmest, connecting the North-East to the rest of India, squeezed between Nepal to the northwest and Bangladesh to the southeast. Its strategic significance is threefold. First, it is a single point of failure: the entire region's road, rail and military logistics funnel through it, so any disruption, natural or hostile, isolates eight states. Second, it sits amid unsettled geopolitics, with Chinese claims and infrastructure activity to the north in the Chumbi Valley area and Bangladesh's political volatility to the south. Third, it explains the region's psychology of distance: when your only physical link to the mainland is a 22-kilometre corridor, New Delhi feels farther than geography suggests.

The corridor also frames the external-support problem. The North-East shares over 5,300 kilometres of international borders, and insurgent groups historically exploited sanctuaries across them: ULFA and NSCN-K in Myanmar, earlier Naga rebels trained with Chinese help, and cooperation from Bangladesh that New Delhi had to negotiate away through diplomacy. Securing the corridor and the borders behind it is therefore not a local policing task but a national strategic one, which is why border infrastructure, the Vibrant Villages Programme on the border belt, and the scrapping of the Free Movement Regime with Myanmar paired with smart fencing are treated as internal-security measures.

The peace process: a decade of accords

The 2025 UPSC question asked candidates to 'map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade'. The map has four layers: accords, force, constitutional accommodation and development.

The accord pipeline, 2015 to 2024:

• Naga Framework Agreement, 2015, with NSCN(IM).
• NLFT(SD) Tripura accord, 2019.
• Bodo Peace Accord, 2020, settling the Bodoland demand in Assam.
• Bru-Reang agreement, 2020, for repatriation and rehabilitation of displaced Brus in Tripura.
• Karbi-Anglong Accord, 2021.
• Assam-Meghalaya boundary agreement, 2022, beginning the settlement of inter-state border disputes.
• Adivasi Peace Accord (Assam), 2022.
• DNLA agreement, 2023.
• UNLF accord, 2023, in Manipur.
• ULFA accord, 29 December 2023, leading to the pro-talks faction's disbandment.
• NLFT-ATTF Tripura Peace Agreement, 4 September 2024, the final milestone with about 328 cadres surrendering.

Force was used proportionately and often jointly with neighbours: Operation All Clear (2003) with Bhutan flushed out Assamese militant camps; Operation Sunrise I and II with Myanmar targeted insurgents affecting Manipur, Nagaland and Assam; and cooperation with Bangladesh led to a crackdown on ULFA bases. Ceasefire and Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreements, such as the 2008 SoO with Kuki groups, froze conflicts while talks proceeded, and surrender-cum-rehabilitation schemes reintegrated former militants.

Constitutional accommodation gave autonomy a legal home. Article 244(2) and the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution provide for Autonomous District Councils in tribal areas, administering local governance for distinct communities. Article 371(A) grants Nagaland special protections for Naga customary law and land. The Inner Line Permit (ILP), an entry-permit system operating in Mizoram, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh and extended to Manipur in 2020, protects indigenous cultural identity by regulating the entry of outsiders. The North Eastern Council (NEC), the statutory regional planning body, coordinates development across the eight states.

Development completed the circuit. The Act East Policy reoriented the region from a remote periphery into India's gateway to South-East Asia, with projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit project and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway. PM-DevINE, a 100 per cent centrally funded scheme with a 6,600 crore rupee outlay for 2022-23 to 2025-26, funds infrastructure, industry and livelihoods. Rail breakthroughs include the 51.38-kilometre Bairabi-Sairang line that gave Mizoram its first passenger train in independent India's history in 2025, alongside UDAN air connectivity, BharatNet digital coverage and the North East Special Infrastructure Development Scheme.

Accords at a glance: the settlement map

A Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) is a signed political settlement in which an armed group abjures violence in return for rehabilitation, development and often autonomous institutional arrangements. The table below is the revision spine for the accord-mapping question; dates are signing dates.

Two cautions keep this table honest. First, the Naga process remains unfinished: the 2015 Framework Agreement with NSCN-IM opened talks that later expanded to the Naga National Political Groups, but a final settlement is still awaited, with a separate flag and constitution among the sticking points. Second, an accord is a beginning, not an outcome - rehabilitation, autonomous-council capacity and inter-state boundary follow-through decide whether peace holds.

Why in news: AFSPA extensions are reviewed every six months. As of October 2026 the disturbed-area tag continued in most of Manipur except 13 police-station areas, in nine Nagaland districts plus 21 police stations elsewhere, and in Tirap, Changlang and Longding in Arunachal Pradesh plus parts of Namsai - while Tripura (2015) and Meghalaya (2018) remain fully withdrawn. Always date-label AFSPA status in an answer; yesterday's map is a wrong answer today.

AFSPA: the law at the centre of the debate

The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 (AFSPA), was enacted to tackle rising unrest in the North-East. It empowers the armed forces in areas declared 'disturbed' under Section 3 to use force including lethal force, and to arrest and search without warrant for the maintenance of public order. Its defenders call it an operational necessity in areas where insurgents outgun the police; its critics call it a licence for excess that alienates the very population counter-insurgency needs to win.

The present status reflects a deliberate phased rollback. AFSPA has been fully withdrawn from Tripura (2015) and Meghalaya (2018), and significantly reduced in Assam, Nagaland and Manipur. It remains selectively in force in parts of Manipur, in nine districts and 21 police-station areas of Nagaland, in three districts of Arunachal Pradesh plus parts of Namsai, and in three districts of Assam (Tinsukia, Charaideo and Sivasagar). The trajectory, from blanket application to selective retention, is itself an answer point: it shows the state calibrating coercion to the actual threat level.

Khalistan: separatism beyond the frontier

The Khalistan movement is the separatist movement advocating an independent Sikh homeland, Khalistan, in Punjab. It emerged from a complex interplay of political, religious, economic and identity-based grievances, evolved from political demands into violent militancy during the 1980s and early 1990s, and was largely crushed by the mid-1990s. Organised militancy within Punjab has since declined sharply, but extremist propaganda continues through overseas networks and online platforms, which is why the theme still appears in security analysis and in UPSC-adjacent current affairs.

The rise, in five drivers:

• Political grievances: the Punjab Reorganisation of 1966, the Chandigarh dispute, sharing of river waters, and demands for greater state autonomy under the Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973.
• Religious and identity assertion: the assertion of Sikh religious and cultural identity, amplified by the rise of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, strengthened separatist mobilisation during the 1980s.
• Socio-economic discontent: the Green Revolution's unequal benefits, declining farm profitability, youth unemployment and agrarian distress created conditions extremists exploited.
• Diaspora support: sections of the Sikh diaspora in Canada, the UK, the US and Australia sustained separatist narratives through funding and propaganda, including Sikhs for Justice and its 'Referendum 2020' campaign.
• Cross-border support: Pakistan's ISI allegedly provided training, arms, financial assistance and safe havens to Khalistani militant groups during the insurgency.

The state's response combined force, law and politics. Operation Blue Star (1984) targeted militants inside the Golden Temple complex; the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the anti-Sikh riots of 1984 that followed deepened mistrust and initially boosted recruitment. Operation Black Thunder followed, and the Punjab Police under K. P. S. Gill led the anti-militancy operations of the 1990s that broke the back of the insurgency. Legislatively, TADA, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, now repealed, and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act were the legal instruments. Politically, the Rajiv-Longowal Accord of 1985 promised Chandigarh's transfer to Punjab but faced implementation challenges.

The implications the movement still carries are fourfold. For national security, it challenges territorial integrity, with arms smuggling and illicit fund flows linked to external actors. For diplomacy, pro-Khalistan activism in the diaspora, protests and vandalism at Indian missions in Canada, the UK, the US and Australia, strains bilateral relations. For social cohesion, the trauma of 1984 continues to fuel alienation among sections of Sikh youth. For domestic politics, separatist sentiment is periodically leveraged by political factions or hostile external entities, though the vast majority of Sikhs prioritise peace and development. The recommended response combines socioeconomic development in Punjab, NIA-led intelligence coordination, diplomatic pressure on partner nations to curb extremists on their soil, and community engagement to address historical grievances.

UPSC and this topic: PYQ weightage

The North-East is a high-frequency theme, and the questions reward state-wise specifics plus the accord map. Khalistan and J&K separatism ride the same 'separatist movements' question family.

• 2025 (15 marks): major challenges to internal security and the peace process in the North-Eastern states, with a mapping of the peace accords and agreements of the past decade.
• 2015 (15 marks): why armed insurgency survived so long in the North-East; the causes answer.
• 2023 (10 marks): winning hearts and minds in terrorism-affected areas as part of conflict resolution in Jammu and Kashmir.
• 2026 (15 marks): separatist movements as a factor in Jammu and Kashmir's militancy and instability, with government actions to bring the region into the national mainstream.

Key Terms

• Siliguri Corridor: The Siliguri Corridor is the narrow strip of West Bengal, roughly 22 kilometres wide at its slimmest, that links mainland India with the Northeast, flanked by Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh and lying close to China's Chumbi Valley. Often called the Chicken's Neck, it is India's most discussed strategic vulnerability. For UPSC it connects geography with national security, since any disruption here would sever the Northeast from the rest of the country. Example: The 2017 Doklam standoff drew attention to Chinese infrastructure uncomfortably close to the corridor..
• Chicken's Neck: The Chicken's Neck is the popular name for the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow strip of West Bengal about 20-22 km wide that connects mainland India to the Northeast. Flanked by Nepal and Bangladesh and lying close to Bhutan and China's Chumbi Valley, its vulnerability shapes India's border security and connectivity planning. It matters for UPSC in geography and internal security as the classic example of a strategic chokepoint.
• Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 (AFSPA): The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 gives armed forces special powers, including arrest without warrant and use of force, in areas declared disturbed, with legal immunity under Section 6. In force in parts of the North-East and J&K, it is criticised for enabling excesses and defended by the Army as essential for counter-insurgency. The Jeevan Reddy Committee recommended its repeal. Example: AFSPA's continued application in parts of Manipur and Nagaland.
• Khalistan: Khalistan is the demand for a separate Sikh homeland, articulated by a separatist movement that peaked in Punjab in the 1980s with militancy, the occupation of the Golden Temple complex and the assassination of Indira Gandhi. The Indian state treats it as a secessionist and terrorism issue. For UPSC, Khalistan frames questions on internal security, federalism and diaspora extremism. Example: Operation Blue Star, the June 1984 army action at the Golden Temple, remains the movement's defining episode..
• ULFA: The United Liberation Front of Asom is the Assamese separatist outfit founded in 1979 seeking a sovereign Assam. Its pro-talks faction signed a Memorandum of Settlement with the Centre and Assam government on 29 December 2023 and disbanded in January 2024, while the hardline ULFA(I) faction under Paresh Baruah remains active from Myanmar. It matters as the principal Assam insurgency. Example: The December 2023 ULFA peace accord ending the pro-talks faction's insurgency.
• NSCN(IM): The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) is the largest Naga insurgent group, formed in 1988 after splitting from the original NSCN. Under ceasefire since 1997, it signed the Naga Framework Agreement with the Centre in 2015 but final settlement talks continue. It matters because the Naga issue is India's oldest insurgency and the template for North-East peace processes. Example: The 2015 Framework Agreement with the NSCN(IM).
• Colonial legacy and isolation: Colonial legacy and isolation refers to the British policy of treating the North-East as an excluded frontier, followed by post-independence neglect and the region's geographic separation by the Siliguri Corridor. It matters because it seeded the narrative that Delhi neither understands nor values the region. Example: The Inner Line system originating in the 1873 Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation.
• Ethnic nationalism: Ethnic nationalism is political mobilisation around a distinct ethnic identity demanding autonomy or sovereignty. In the North-East, Naga, Mizo, Bodo, Meitei and other identities each produced insurgencies. It matters because overlapping ethnic claims make any settlement a zero-sum contest. Example: Naga nationalism cutting across Nagaland, Manipur, Assam and Arunachal.
• Demographic anxiety: Demographic anxiety is the fear among indigenous communities that migration will reduce them to a minority in their homeland, as in Tripura and parts of Assam. It matters because it converts economic competition into an existential security issue, fuelling both insurgency and anti-migrant politics. Example: Tripura, where tribals became a minority after Partition-era migration.
• Delayed political recognition: Delayed political recognition is the long gap between the emergence of regional aspirations and their accommodation through statehood or autonomy, as with Nagaland (1963), Mizoram (1987) and Bodoland's territorial council. Delay radicalises moderates. It matters because timely accommodation has repeatedly defused insurgencies. Example: The decades-long wait for a Naga political settlement.
• Geography and external support: Geography and external support refers to the North-East's porous borders with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Bhutan and China, which gave insurgents sanctuaries, arms routes and training camps. It matters because no insurgency survives long without a rear base, and diplomacy with neighbours has been central to ending them. Example: ULFA camps in Bhutan destroyed in Operation All Clear, 2003.
• Governance deficits: Governance deficits are the failures of administration, service delivery and justice that alienate border populations and give insurgents a governance pitch. In the North-East they show up as corruption, stalled projects and unresponsive policing. Counter-insurgency doctrine treats closing these gaps as essential as operations. Example: Stalled development projects in insurgency-hit Manipur districts.
• Naga Framework Agreement: The Naga Framework Agreement is the 3 August 2015 pact between the Centre and the NSCN(IM) setting agreed principles for a final Naga settlement, while keeping details confidential. It matters as the high-water mark of the Naga peace process, though a final accord remains elusive over demands like a separate flag and constitution. Example: The 2015 signing between the Centre and NSCN(IM) leadership.
• NLFT(SD) Tripura accord: The NLFT(SD) Tripura accord is the August 2019 Memorandum of Settlement with the National Liberation Front of Tripura (S.D. Biswas faction), under which cadres surrendered arms and joined the mainstream. It matters as one of the accords that effectively ended Tripura's insurgency. Example: The 2019 surrender of NLFT(SD) cadres in Tripura.
• Bodo Peace Accord: The Bodo Peace Accord is the tripartite Memorandum of Settlement signed on 27 January 2020 with four NDFB factions, the ABSU and the UBPO. It created the Bodoland Territorial Region with expanded powers and a development package, after which NDFB factions disbanded. It matters as the settlement that ended Assam's Bodo insurgency. Example: The 2020 accord creating the Bodoland Territorial Region.
• Bru-Reang agreement: The Bru-Reang agreement is the January 2020 settlement to permanently resettle over 35,000 Bru (Reang) tribals displaced from Mizoram to Tripura since 1997, with land, housing and a financial package. It matters as the resolution of one of India's longest internal displacement crises. Example: Resettlement of Bru families in Tripura under the 2020 package.
• Karbi-Anglong Accord: The Karbi-Anglong Accord is the Memorandum of Settlement signed on 4 September 2021 with Karbi insurgent groups, under which over 1,000 cadres surrendered. It provided for development of the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council areas. It matters as the settlement ending decades of Karbi militancy in Assam. Example: The 2021 surrender of Karbi armed groups.
• Assam-Meghalaya boundary agreement: The Assam-Meghalaya boundary agreement is the March 2022 pact resolving six of the twelve disputed sectors along the inter-state border, the first such settlement between the two states in fifty years. It matters because inter-state boundary disputes are a recurring trigger of localised violence in the North-East. Example: The 2022 resolution of six disputed border sectors.
• Adivasi Peace Accord (Assam): The Adivasi Peace Accord is the Memorandum of Settlement signed on 15 September 2022 with eight Adivasi militant groups of Assam, under which 1,182 cadres joined the mainstream. It addressed the long-running grievances of tea-tribe communities. It matters as the settlement ending Adivasi militancy in Assam. Example: The 2022 surrender of 1,182 Adivasi cadres.
• DNLA agreement: The DNLA agreement is the Memorandum of Settlement signed on 27 April 2023 with the Dimasa National Liberation Army and its political wing, ending the insurgency in Assam's Dima Hasao district. Over 168 cadres surrendered with a development package for the region. It matters as the accord that ended Dimasa militancy. Example: The April 2023 settlement ending the Dima Hasao insurgency.
• UNLF accord: The UNLF accord is the peace agreement signed on 29 November 2023 with the United National Liberation Front, Manipur's oldest valley-based insurgent group, under which it agreed to renounce violence and respect the Constitution. It matters as the first agreement with a Meitei valley-based armed group. Example: The November 2023 UNLF agreement to abjure violence.
• ULFA accord: The ULFA accord is the Memorandum of Settlement signed on 29 December 2023 with the ULFA pro-talks faction, under which 852 cadres surrendered and the group disbanded in January 2024. It matters as the formal end of the mainstream Assamese insurgency, leaving only the Paresh Baruah faction active. Example: The December 2023 settlement with the ULFA pro-talks faction.
• NLFT-ATTF Tripura Peace Agreement: The NLFT-ATTF Tripura Peace Agreement is the March 2024 accord with the National Liberation Front of Tripura and the All Tripura Tiger Force, the last active Tripura insurgent groups. Their cadres surrendered arms and joined the mainstream. It matters as the agreement that effectively ended insurgency in Tripura. Example: The 2024 surrender of the last Tripura insurgent groups.
• Operation All Clear (2003): Operation All Clear was the December 2003 Royal Bhutan Army operation, conducted with Indian support, that destroyed ULFA, NDFB and KLO camps in southern Bhutan. It matters as the first successful case of a neighbour acting against anti-India insurgent sanctuaries, made possible by sustained diplomacy. Example: Bhutan's 2003 flushing of ULFA camps.
• Operation Sunrise I and II: Operations Sunrise I and II were coordinated India-Myanmar Army operations in 2019 targeting insurgent camps along the border, hitting groups like the NSCN(K), ULFA(I) and Arakanese outfits. They matter as the model of joint cross-border counter-insurgency with Myanmar. Example: The 2019 joint strikes on insurgent camps in Myanmar.
• Article 244(2): Article 244(2) of the Constitution applies the Sixth Schedule to the tribal areas of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram, providing for Autonomous District Councils with legislative and executive powers. It matters as the constitutional basis of tribal autonomy in the North-East. Example: The Bodoland Territorial Council constituted under the Sixth Schedule.
• Sixth Schedule: The Sixth Schedule is the part of the Constitution (Articles 244(2) and 275(1)) providing for the administration of tribal areas in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram through Autonomous District Councils and Autonomous Regional Councils. These councils can legislate on land, forests, customs and village administration and receive grants from the Consolidated Fund of India. It matters for UPSC polity questions on tribal autonomy and governors' powers. Example: The Bodoland Territorial Council, Assam.
• Article 371(A): Article 371(A) gives Nagaland special constitutional protections: Parliament cannot legislate on Naga customary law, land ownership and religious practices without the state assembly's concurrence. It matters as the constitutional guarantee at the heart of Naga identity politics. Example: Naga customary law protected from parliamentary legislation.
• Inner Line Permit (ILP): The Inner Line Permit is the travel document required for non-residents to enter Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur, originating in the colonial Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation of 1873. It matters as both a protector of tribal demography and a friction point for integration and tourism. Example: ILP requirements for entering Arunachal Pradesh.
• North Eastern Council (NEC): The North Eastern Council is the statutory regional planning body for the eight North-Eastern states, set up in 1971 and functioning under the Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region. It funds inter-state infrastructure and development projects. It matters as the institutional expression of the Centre's special responsibility for the region. Example: NEC-funded inter-state road and power projects.
• Act East Policy: The Act East Policy is India's 2014 upgrade of the Look East Policy into proactive engagement with Southeast and East Asia, announced by the Modi government at the 2014 East Asia Summit. It emphasises economic integration, connectivity through the Northeast, and strategic partnerships with ASEAN, Japan, and Australia. For UPSC, it anchors GS-2 answers on India's Indo-Pacific strategy and countering China's regional influence. Example: the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, a flagship connectivity project under the policy.
• PM-DevINE: PM-DevINE, the Prime Minister's Development Initiative for North East Region, is the central sector scheme launched in 2022 to fund infrastructure and social development projects in the North-East. It matters as the dedicated funding vehicle for closing the region's development gap. Example: PM-DevINE funding for bamboo and tourism infrastructure.
• Khalistan movement: The Khalistan movement is the Sikh separatist campaign for an independent homeland, which turned into a violent insurgency in Punjab in the 1980s. Though the militancy was defeated by the mid-1990s, extremist networks persist abroad, especially in Canada and the UK. It matters because diaspora-driven revival attempts strain India's diplomacy. Example: The 1980s Punjab insurgency and its overseas remnants.
• Political grievances: Political grievances are perceived injustices in representation, autonomy and democratic process that fuel separatism, from the rigged 1987 J&K elections to unfulfilled accords. They matter because insurgencies almost always begin as political disputes before turning violent. Example: The widely criticised 1987 Jammu and Kashmir assembly elections.
• Religious and identity assertion: Religious and identity assertion is the mobilisation of faith or ethnic identity into a political claim, as in Khalistani Sikh separatism or Naga Christian identity. It matters because identity gives insurgencies emotional depth that material concessions alone cannot address. Example: Sikh identity politics during the Punjab crisis.
• Socio-economic discontent: Socio-economic discontent is the frustration arising from unemployment, agrarian distress and unequal development that makes radical narratives attractive. It matters as the fertile soil in which both Khalistani and Kashmiri militancy found recruits. Example: Punjab's agrarian distress feeding 1980s radicalisation.
• Diaspora support: Diaspora support is the funding, propaganda and political lobbying provided to separatist causes by emigrant communities, as with Khalistani networks in Canada, the UK and the US. It matters because it gives declining domestic movements money, safe haven and international visibility. Example: Khalistani fundraising and referendums organised abroad.
• Cross-border support: Cross-border support is the provision of funds, weapons, training, sanctuaries and diplomatic cover to militant groups by a neighbouring state. It matters because it is the force multiplier that turns local grievances into sustained insurgencies, from Pakistan's backing of Kashmir militancy to Myanmar-based camps of North-East groups. Example: Training camps for Kashmir militants across the LoC.
• Operation Blue Star (1984): Operation Blue Star was the June 1984 Army operation to flush out armed militants led by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale from the Golden Temple complex in Amritsar. It succeeded militarily but caused extensive damage to the shrine and deep Sikh hurt, triggering the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the 1984 anti-Sikh violence. It matters as the traumatic turning point of the Punjab crisis. Example: The June 1984 Army action at the Golden Temple.
• Operation Black Thunder: Operation Black Thunder was the 1988 NSG-led operation that cleared militants from the Golden Temple with minimal damage, in contrast to Blue Star. It matters as the demonstration that precise, restrained force could succeed where overwhelming force had backfired, and it broke the back of the Punjab militancy's shrine sanctuary. Example: The 1988 siege that ended militant occupation of the Golden Temple.
• TADA: The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985, known as TADA, was India's first dedicated anti-terror law, with stringent bail and confession provisions. It lapsed in 1995 amid criticism of misuse. It matters as the legislative ancestor of POTA and UAPA, and a cautionary tale on balancing security with liberties. Example: TADA prosecutions during the Punjab militancy.
• Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967: The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 is India's principal anti-terror law, criminalising terrorist acts, terrorist organisations and support to them. The 2019 amendment allows designation of individuals, not just organisations, as terrorists. It matters because almost every major terror prosecution, from Kashmir militancy to urban modules, runs through UAPA. Example: Designation of Masood Azhar as a terrorist under the 2019 amendment.
• Rajiv-Longowal Accord of 1985: The Rajiv-Longowal Accord was the July 1985 settlement between Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Akali leader Harchand Singh Longowal addressing Punjab's demands on Chandigarh, river waters and the Anandpur Sahib resolution. Longowal's assassination weeks later crippled its implementation. It matters as the political settlement that could have ended the Punjab crisis earlier. Example: The 1985 accord on Chandigarh and Punjab's river waters.
• Memorandum of Settlement (MoS): a signed settlement under which an armed group abjures violence for rehabilitation, development and institutional arrangements. Example: the Bodo MoS of 27 January 2020.
• Naga Framework Agreement, 2015: the August 2015 framework between the Government of India and NSCN-IM recognising the unique history of the Nagas; a final settlement is still awaited.
• Golden Triangle: the opium-producing junction of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand whose drug routes enter India through the North-East.

Practice questions