Against Exploitation, for Faith: Articles 23 to 28

Articles 23 to 28 protect two things the framers considered non-negotiable: the body and the conscience. Articles 23 and 24 outlaw exploitation in its oldest forms, trafficking, forced labour and child labour. Articles 25 to 28 then build India's distinctive religious liberty: not a wall between state and religion, but a principled distance in which the state protects faith while reserving the right to reform it. This article covers both halves and the secularism that binds them.

Article 23: no trafficking, no begar, no forced labour

Article 23 prohibits traffic in human beings, begar and other similar forms of forced labour, declaring any contravention punishable by law. Begar is the old practice of compelling labour without payment; forced labour covers every form of compulsion, including bonded labour. Parliament has given teeth to the article through the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act of 1956 and the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act of 1976.

Two features make Article 23 unusual. First, it is available against the State and private individuals alike, so an exploitative employer cannot hide behind private contract. Second, the Supreme Court has read it expansively: in People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982), the Asiad Games case, the Court held that forcing workers to accept less than the minimum wage amounts to forced labour under Article 23. The article does allow one exception: the State may impose compulsory service for public purposes, such as military conscription or compulsory social service, provided it does not discriminate on grounds of religion, race, caste or class.

Article 24: childhood is not a workforce

Article 24 provides that no child below the age of fourteen years shall be employed to work in any factory or mine or engaged in any other hazardous employment. The prohibition is absolute within its field: it does not merely regulate child labour, it bans it in the listed employments. Parliament first legislated comprehensively through the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act of 1986.

The protection has widened over time. The Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Amendment Act of 2016 imposed a complete ban on employing children below fourteen in all occupations and processes, and barred adolescents between fourteen and eighteen from hazardous occupations and processes. Read with the 86th Amendment of 2002, which made elementary education a fundamental right under Article 21A and added the parental duty in Article 51A(k), the constitutional message is coherent: the years below fourteen belong to the classroom, not the workshop.

Article 25: conscience, profession, practice, propagation

Article 25 guarantees to all persons freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. Conscience covers inner belief, including the right not to believe; profession is public declaration; practice is worship and ritual; propagation is the right to communicate one's beliefs, though not to convert by force, fraud or inducement, a distinction the Supreme Court drew in Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1977) while upholding anti-conversion laws.

The freedom is subject to public order, morality and health, and to the other provisions of Part III, which is how the state justifies intervention when religious practice collides with fundamental rights. Article 25(2) expressly saves two state powers: regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice, and providing for social welfare and reform or throwing open Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes of Hindus. Two explanations do definitional work: wearing and carrying kirpans is part of professing the Sikh religion, and the word Hindus in the temple-entry clause includes Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists, so the reform power reaches their institutions too.

The essential practices test: who decides what religion is

Because Article 25 protects religious practice but the State may regulate secular activity, courts needed a test to tell the two apart. In the Shirur Mutt case (1954) the Supreme Court formulated the essential religious practices doctrine: only practices integral or essential to a religion receive Article 25 protection, and the Court decides essentiality by examining the religion's own tenets. Later cases refined and contested the test: the Court upheld the ban on triple talaq in Shayara Bano (2017) and opened the Sabarimala temple to women of all ages in 2018, holding that constitutional morality prevails over exclusionary custom. The doctrine remains one of the most debated in Indian constitutional law, because it makes secular judges the arbiters of faith.

Article 26: what denominations may manage

Where Article 25 protects the individual believer, Article 26 protects the religious denomination or any section of it. Every denomination has four rights, subject to public order, morality and health: to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, to own and acquire movable and immovable property, and to administer that property in accordance with law. The crucial line, drawn in the Durgah Committee case (1961), separates matters of religion, which the denomination controls, from secular administration, which the State may regulate. Appointing priests, for instance, has been treated as a secular function the State can regulate, while the content of worship remains with the denomination.

Articles 27 and 28: the state's purse and the classroom

Article 27 provides that no person shall be compelled to pay any tax for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. The provision targets taxes, not fees: the State may levy a fee for a specific service rendered, but it may not use the taxing power to fund one faith. Article 28 deals with religious instruction in educational institutions. No religious instruction may be provided in institutions wholly maintained out of State funds. In institutions administered by the State but established under an endowment or trust requiring religious instruction, that instruction may continue. In institutions recognised by or receiving aid from the State, no person may be compelled to attend religious instruction or worship without consent, or without a guardian's consent in the case of a minor.

Indian secularism: principled distance, not a wall

Articles 25 to 28, read with the equality provisions, produce a secularism unlike the American wall of separation. The Indian State has no official religion and treats all religions with equal respect, but it intervenes to reform them: abolishing untouchability, opening temples, banning triple talaq, regulating temple administration. Scholars call this principled distance: the State keeps its distance from religion as a rule but steps in when religious practice violates fundamental rights or social welfare. In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court held secularism to be part of the basic structure of the Constitution, placing it beyond Parliament's amending power.

The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 and the Article 25-26 debate

In April 2025 Parliament passed the Waqf (Amendment) Act, amending the Waqf Act of 1995 and renaming it the UMEED Act, short for Unified Waqf Management, Empowerment, Efficiency, and Development. A waqf is the permanent dedication of property under Islamic law for religious or charitable purposes, and its administration sits on the fault line between Article 25 and Article 26.

Petitioners invoke Article 26, the denomination's right to manage its own religious affairs: mandatory non-Muslim members on waqf boards, the rule that only Muslims practising Islam for five years may create a waqf, and Collector-led inquiries into waqf status all encroach on that autonomy. The government replies with Article 25(2), which expressly permits regulating the secular and economic activity associated with religious practice, arguing the changes target mismanagement through registration, audits and the end of waqf-by-user claims.

In September 2025 the Supreme Court refused a blanket stay but froze the sharpest provisions: collectors cannot alter waqf status during inquiry, non-Muslim board membership is capped to preserve a Muslim majority, and the five-year rule stays suspended until verification rules are framed. The UMEED portal, launched in June 2025, meanwhile pushes all waqf registration onto a central digital platform. The episode is principled distance under live examination.

The statutory overlay: the Places of Worship Act, 1991

The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 is the statute that freezes the religious character of every place of worship as it stood on 15 August 1947, barring suits that seek to convert it. Ayodhya was expressly excepted because its suits were already pending. It is the legislative counterpart to the Article 25 to 26 discussion: the Constitution protects the freedom of religion, and this Act protects the status quo of its buildings.

The live Article 44 debate: Uttarakhand's UCC

The Uttarakhand Uniform Civil Code, 2024 is the first state-level uniform civil code in independent India: passed in February 2024 and in force from 27 January 2025, it lays down a common law of marriage, divorce, succession and inheritance for all communities in the state, with mandatory registration of live-in relationships. Scheduled Tribes are excluded. It is the religion-DPSP interface in live form: Article 44 directs the state to endeavour to secure a uniform civil code, and Uttarakhand is the test case the rest of the country is watching.

Prelims hooks

• Article 23 operates against private individuals; PUDR (1982) held underpayment of minimum wages is forced labour.
• Article 23 permits compulsory service for public purposes without discrimination on religion, race, caste or class.
• Bonded labour was abolished by the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976; immoral trafficking is covered by the 1956 Act.
• Article 24: no child below fourteen in factories, mines or hazardous employment; the 2016 amendment banned all child labour below fourteen and hazardous work for adolescents.
• Article 25 rights: conscience, profess, practise, propagate; subject to public order, morality, health and other fundamental rights.
• Essential religious practices doctrine: Shirur Mutt (1954); Rev. Stainislaus (1977) upheld anti-conversion laws; Shayara Bano (2017) and Sabarimala (2018) applied constitutional morality.
• Article 26: four denominational rights; Durgah Committee (1961) drew the religious-versus-secular line.
• Article 27 bars taxes for promoting a religion; Article 28 bars religious instruction in wholly State-funded institutions and compulsion elsewhere.
• S.R. Bommai (1994): secularism is part of the basic structure; Indian secularism is principled distance, not strict separation.
• Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 (UMEED Act): challenged under Article 26; the Supreme Court's September 2025 interim order stayed the collector-inquiry powers, capped non-Muslim board membership and froze the five-year practice rule.

Mains angle

A religion question in GS-2 is really a question about the Indian model of secularism. Frame the answer as a contrast: the American wall of separation versus India's principled distance, where the State funds the Haj and the Kumbh impartially, runs minority institutions under Article 30, and simultaneously reforms personal law and temple practice. Use the essential practices doctrine as the analytical pivot, showing how Shirur Mutt empowered courts to protect faith while Shayara Bano and Sabarimala empowered them to reform it, and note the criticism that the test makes judges theologians. On exploitation, present Articles 23 and 24 as the Constitution's earliest social-justice guarantees, and evaluate their record honestly: bonded labour abolished in law in 1976 yet persisting in brick kilns and quarries, child labour banned yet visible in supply chains, which lets you argue that the gap is enforcement, not text.

Key Terms

• The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 is: The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 is the law that freezes the religious character of every place of worship as it existed on 15 August 1947 and bars suits seeking its conversion. It exempts the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid dispute and ancient monuments protected under the AMASR Act. It matters for UPSC as a live GS-2 topic on secularism, judicial review, and the balance between religious sentiment and constitutional values. the 15 August 1947 cut-off date for the religious character of places of worship
• The Uttarakhand Uniform Civil Code, 2024 is: The Uttarakhand Uniform Civil Code, 2024 is India's first state-level common civil code, passed on 7 February 2024 and brought into force on 27 January 2025. It standardises marriage, divorce, inheritance and live-in relationship registration across religions, excluding Scheduled Tribes. For UPSC, it is the flagship example in any Article 44 debate, linking the Directive Principles, gender justice and the federal question of whether states can legislate a UCC. UCC brought into force in Uttarakhand, 27 January 2025
• Uniform Civil Code: The Uniform Civil Code is a proposal to replace India's religion-based personal laws with a single set of secular laws governing marriage, divorce, inheritance, and adoption for all citizens. Article 44 of the Constitution directs the state to endeavour to secure such a code. For UPSC, the UCC is a recurring polity question balancing gender justice and national integration against religious freedom; Uttarakhand became the first state to enforce its own code on 27 January 2025. The Supreme Court's 1985 Shah Bano judgment, which urged Parliament to enact a UCC, remains the landmark judicial reference in the debate.
• Union of India: The Union of India is the constitutional name of the Indian state, comprising the States and Union Territories in the First Schedule, as Article 1 declares that India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States. It is the legal personality that can sue and be sued under Article 300 and that can acquire territory. For UPSC, the term is the starting point of every GS-2 discussion of Indian federalism. Article 1 of the Constitution
• constitutional morality: Constitutional morality is fidelity to the Constitution's core values, justice, liberty, equality, fraternity, in interpreting and applying the law, even when popular morality or tradition points the other way. The Supreme Court has invoked it to strike down discriminatory laws and customs. For UPSC, it is a high-yield GS-2 concept, central to mains answers on judicial review, transformative constitutionalism, and the limits of majoritarianism. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018), decriminalizing Section 377
• Religious institutions: Religious institutions are bodies such as temples, mosques, churches, maths, and wakfs that manage places of worship and religious endowments. Article 26 gives religious denominations the right to manage their own affairs in matters of religion, balanced against the state's power to regulate secular administration. They matter for UPSC in GS-2 questions on temple administration and the debate over state control of Hindu temples. The Sree Padmanabhaswamy temple case decided by the Supreme Court in 2020
• Live-in relationships: Live-in relationship is a domestic arrangement in which two unmarried adults cohabit as partners without a formal marriage. In India it is not illegal: courts have extended protections like the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 to unions resembling marriage, though maintenance, succession and custody rights remain unsettled. Uttarakhand's Uniform Civil Code, 2024 mandates registration of such relationships. For UPSC, it links GS-1 family-change topics with GS-2 rights jurisprudence and the Uniform Civil Code debate. Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (Supreme Court of India, 2013)
• principled distance: Principled distance is political theorist Rajeev Bhargava's description of Indian secularism, in which the state keeps a principled, not absolute, distance from all religions. The state may intervene in religious affairs to uphold liberty and equality, as in temple-entry or personal-law reforms, while otherwise treating all faiths even-handedly. It is the standard GS-2 (polity) framework contrasting Indian and Western secularism. Rajeev Bhargava's writings on Indian secular democracy.
• fundamental rights: Fundamental Rights are the justiciable individual rights guaranteed by Part III of the Indian Constitution (Articles 12 to 35). They comprise six categories today, namely the right to equality, the right to freedom, the right against exploitation, the right to freedom of religion, cultural and educational rights, and the right to constitutional remedies. They matter for UPSC because they are the constitutional core tested against legislative and executive action, and because right to property was removed from Part III by the 44th Amendment in 1978, becoming the legal right under Article 300A. The Supreme Court's Kesavananda Bharati judgment of 1973, which upheld Parliament's power to amend Fundamental Rights but limited it through the basic structure doctrine.
• fundamental right: Fundamental right is a basic liberty guaranteed to citizens and persons under Part III (Articles 12-35) of the Indian Constitution, enforceable directly in the Supreme Court under Article 32 and in High Courts under Article 226. The six groups cover equality, freedom, protection against exploitation, religious freedom, cultural and educational rights, and constitutional remedies. For UPSC (GS-2, polity), they are the most-tested constitutional topic. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), where the Court upheld the basic structure doctrine
• Durgah Committee: The Durgah Committee is the statutory body administering the dargah of Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti at Ajmer, constituted under the Durgah Khwaja Saheb Act, 1955. It manages the shrine's endowments, properties and offerings, and oversees facilities for pilgrims visiting one of India's most revered Sufi shrines. Example: the Committee manages arrangements during the annual Urs festival. UPSC relevance: state regulation of religious endowments and the administration of minority institutions. The Committee's management of nazrana offerings and guest houses funds services for lakhs of annual pilgrims.
• 86th Amendment: The 86th Amendment (2002) is the constitutional amendment that made elementary education a fundamental right, inserting Article 21A guaranteeing free and compulsory education to children aged 6 to 14. It revised Article 45 to cover early childhood care below age six, and added clause (k) to Article 51A making it a fundamental duty of parents to ensure their children's education. For UPSC it is the constitutional basis of the right to education, given legislative effect by the RTE Act, 2009. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, which gave legislative effect to Article 21A.

Practice questions

Articles 23 and 24: the anti-exploitation pair

Article 23 of the Indian Constitution is a fundamental right that safeguards individuals from two key forms of exploitation: trafficking in human beings and forced labour. It prohibits trafficking, begar (unpaid forced labour, historically tied to debt bondage) and other similar forms of forced labour, and makes violations punishable by law. In PUDR v. Union of India the Court held that economic compulsion leaving a worker no real choice also counts as forced labour.

Article 24 specifically safeguards children from hazardous work. It prohibits the employment of children below 14 years in factories, mines or other hazardous work, while leaving non-hazardous, age-appropriate work untouched. Parliament enforces it through laws such as the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986.

Articles 25 to 28: religion and the state

The Indian Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of religion in Articles 25 to 28. This enshrines the principle of religious tolerance and pluralism in India's diverse society. Article 25 guarantees four freedoms to all persons, citizen or not: freedom of conscience and the free profession, practice and propagation of religion, subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of the Constitution.

Article 26 protects the collective side: every religious denomination may manage its religious affairs, own and acquire property and administer it according to law. The contrast matters: Article 25 protects individual religious rights, Article 26 safeguards collective religious freedoms, and both yield to public order, morality and health. Article 27 bars compelling anyone to pay taxes for promoting a particular religion, and Article 28 bars religious instruction in institutions wholly funded by the State, with an exception for endowment-based institutions.

The current docket keeps testing these articles. In November 2024 the Supreme Court revisited Aligarh Muslim University's minority status under Article 30 in a 4:3 verdict, reading established broadly to mean the community that actually created the institution, and left the final determination to a separate bench. The Court has also referred the Pramati (2014) ruling, which had excluded minority institutions from the RTE Act, for reconsideration by a larger bench, reopening the balance between Article 21A and Article 30(1).