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Saturday, 21 November 2026 · New Delhi

International Relations· Prelims · GS-II

The SCO: India's Eurasian balancing act

Why India joined a China-led Eurasian security forum in 2017, what it gains from RATS, Central Asia access and the diplomatic platform, and where China and Pakistan limit the payoff.

By Sujit27 September 2026Updated 20 November 202617 min readintermediate
The SCO: India's Eurasian balancing act | UPSC

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is the Eurasian forum India once watched from the outside and then decided it could not afford to miss. Founded in 2001 by China, Russia and four Central Asian states as the successor to the Shanghai Five, the SCO combines counter-terrorism, economic cooperation and a vision of a multipolar order. India became a full member in 2017, alongside Pakistan, and has since used the platform for Central Asia access, counter-terrorism coordination and rare diplomatic face-time with rivals.

For UPSC, the SCO is the mirror image of the Quad question: if the Quad is India’s Indo-Pacific bet with the West, the SCO is its Eurasian hedge with China and Russia in the room. This article covers the origins, what India gains, the China-Pakistan constraints, and how Delhi balances SCO membership with its other coalitions.

Origins: from the Shanghai Five to a ten-member forum

The SCO’s roots are in border demilitarisation: the Shanghai Five, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, formed in 1996 to settle post-Soviet boundary questions, with Uzbekistan joining to create the SCO in 2001. The Charter, signed in 2002 and in force from 2003, set the organisation’s aims: mutual trust, countering terrorism, separatism and extremism, and economic cooperation. Expansion came in waves: India and Pakistan in 2017, Iran in 2023, Belarus in 2024, with observer states and dialogue partners extending its reach further.

The structure is intergovernmental and consensus-based. The Heads of State Council is the supreme body, meeting at annual summits; the Secretariat sits in Beijing; and RATS, based in Tashkent, coordinates counter-terrorism through intelligence sharing, joint exercises and a common database of extremist organisations.

Why India joined

Three motives drove the 2017 decision. First, geography: the SCO is the only multilateral table where India sits with all five Central Asian republics, the region of its Connect Central Asia policy, uranium and hydrocarbon stakes, and the Afghanistan question. Second, security: RATS gives India a formal channel on terrorism, extremism, narcotics and intelligence sharing in a region where Pakistan-based groups operate. Third, diplomacy: the summit sidelines are one of the few neutral venues where Indian leaders meet Chinese and Pakistani counterparts, as at the reported 2025 Tianjin meeting where border and trade issues were discussed.

Prime Minister Modi’s 2022 Samarkand line, "today’s era is not an era of war," delivered on SCO soil, captured the posture Delhi wants: present in Eurasian security conversations, but as a voice for dialogue rather than confrontation.

What India actually gains

On counter-terrorism, RATS coordination has given India a multilateral hook for its core concern: at the reported 44th RATS Council meeting in 2025, India pressed for action against the sponsors, financiers and perpetrators of the Pahalgam terror attack, using the forum’s own language against Pakistan. On connectivity, SCO declarations have acknowledged the International North-South Transport Corridor, and the forum keeps the TAPI pipeline and Central Asian uranium cooperation on the diplomatic agenda. On energy, discussions within the SCO framework cover Turkmen gas and Central Asian hydrocarbons that India cannot easily reach bilaterally.

The diplomatic dividend is quieter but real. The SCO gives India a standing invitation to Eurasian security talks it would otherwise watch from outside, and a platform for initiatives like the SCO Startup Forum launched in 2021. For an aspirant to a larger global role, absence from the table would cost more than the frustrations of sitting at it.

The China-Pakistan problem

The constraints are as structural as the gains. China’s push to steer the SCO, including promoting the Belt and Road Initiative through its declarations, risks turning the forum into a China-centric platform; India’s response has been to withhold endorsement of BRI language on sovereignty grounds, as it did at the 2023 summit over CPEC’s passage through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Pakistan, meanwhile, has repeatedly raised Kashmir in SCO settings, and at the reported 2025 defence ministers’ meeting India publicly held Pakistan responsible as a supporter of terrorism.

The economic payoff is thin. Logistical barriers and the absence of direct land access, Pakistan denies India transit to Central Asia, mean India-SCO trade is dwarfed by China-SCO trade, reported at over US$500 billion in 2024. And the balancing act with the Quad is constant: Delhi skipped the 2024 Astana summit while engaging Quad partners, a signal Beijing read as deliberate. The SCO does not replace anything; it adds a constrained but useful Eurasian channel.

Balancing the SCO with the Quad and BRICS

India’s standard defence of dual membership is functional: the Quad serves Indo-Pacific and technology interests, BRICS serves development finance and Global South voice, and the SCO serves Eurasian security and Central Asia access. No single forum gets exclusivity, which is the working definition of multi-alignment. The test cases are instructive: India can discuss LAC disengagement with China on SCO sidelines in one month and coordinate maritime domain awareness with Quad partners the next, without either engagement cancelling the other.

Where the three groupings overlapBRICSSCOG20India, China,RussiaIranBrazil, South Africa,IndonesianoneEgypt, Ethiopia,UAEPakistan, CentralAsian statesUS, Japan, EU and others
India, China and Russia sit in all three groupings, which is why New Delhi can hedge across institutions. Iran bridges BRICS and the SCO; Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia bridge BRICS and the G20. Memberships as the articles teach them: BRICS after its expansion to Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the UAE and Indonesia, and the SCO at ten members after Belarus joined in 2024.

What examiners keep asking

  • The aims-and-objectives answer runs: counter the "three evils" (terrorism, separatism, extremism), build mutual trust, deepen economic cooperation, and promote a multipolar order.
  • India’s importance-to-SCO and SCO’s importance-to-India are two different questions; answer the one asked.
  • The "virus of conflict" framing is the standard way to discuss how bilateral disputes infect multilateral forums, with India’s mitigation role as the follow-up.

Tianjin 2025: the silver jubilee summit

The 25th SCO Summit, held in Tianjin on 31 August-1 September 2025, was the largest in the organisation's history and its silver-jubilee edition. The theme, "Advancing the Shanghai Spirit: SCO in Action", framed the Tianjin Declaration, which covered security, connectivity, trade, energy and cultural cooperation. The declaration condemned the Pahalgam terror attack, a significant line for India, and members adopted an AI cooperation roadmap alongside statements on energy and multilateralism.

Prime Minister Modi articulated India's approach through three pillars: security, connectivity and opportunity. On security, he pressed for united action against terrorism, radicalisation and extremism, and proposed a Civilizational Dialogue Forum to counter radicalisation through cultural exchange. On connectivity, India reaffirmed support for the Chabahar port and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), insisting that connectivity initiatives respect sovereignty and territorial integrity. On opportunity, he backed cooperation in startups, innovation and traditional medicine.

The summit's big structural moves came from China. President Xi Jinping proposed the Global Governance Initiative (GGI), calling for a more just and equitable global governance system, and the idea found a place in the Tianjin Declaration. Leaders proposed an SCO Development Bank to fund regional projects, accepted Laos as a dialogue partner (taking the SCO family to 10 members plus 17 partners, 27 in all), and confirmed Kyrgyzstan as chair for 2025-26. China pledged RMB 2 billion in grants, 100 "Small and Beautiful" livelihood projects and more Luban Workshops for vocational training. The members also adopted the SCO Anti-Drug Strategy for 2024-2029, giving the RATS counter-terror architecture a narcotics counterpart.

Item

Detail

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25th SCO Summit

Tianjin, 31 August-1 September 2025; theme "Advancing the Shanghai Spirit: SCO in Action"

Outcome document

Tianjin Declaration; Pahalgam attack condemned

Modi's three pillars

Security, connectivity, opportunity

New initiatives

Global Governance Initiative (China); SCO Development Bank proposal; Civilizational Dialogue Forum (India)

Membership

Laos accepted as dialogue partner: 10 members + 17 partners

Chair

Kyrgyzstan for 2025-26

For UPSC, Tianjin 2025 is the summit to quote: it shows the SCO as the one Eurasian table where India and China still negotiate in the same room, and India's three-pillar framing gives a ready-made structure for any mains answer on India's Eurasian strategy.

Key Terms

  • SCO: SCO is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, a Eurasian grouping for political, economic and security cooperation founded in Shanghai in 2001. Its six founders (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) were joined by India and Pakistan in 2017, Iran in 2023 and Belarus in 2024, making ten members. It focuses on counter-terrorism, connectivity and regional stability. For UPSC, it tests GS-2 understanding of how India engages China- and Russia-led forums while guarding its interests. India's full membership, admitted at the 2017 Astana summit alongside Pakistan.
  • Quad: Quad is the strategic dialogue of India, the United States, Japan and Australia, aimed at a free and open Indo-Pacific. It is not a formal military alliance but a flexible platform for cooperation on maritime security, critical technologies, supply chains and humanitarian assistance. For UPSC, it exemplifies India's multi-alignment: deepening US partnership while preserving strategic autonomy and engaging China-adjacent security concerns without a treaty commitment. The first Quad Leaders' Summit, held virtually in March 2021, which launched working groups on vaccines, climate and critical tech.
  • Connect Central Asia policy: The Connect Central Asia Policy, unveiled in June 2012 at the first India-Central Asia Dialogue in Bishkek, is India's framework for engaging the five Central Asian republics. It covers political ties, trade, energy security, counter-terrorism, and connectivity through the INSTC and Chabahar port. For UPSC, it marks India's extended-neighbourhood outreach to an energy-rich region where China and Russia compete for influence. The first India-Central Asia Summit, held virtually in January 2022, institutionalised the engagement at the leaders' level.
  • International North-South Transport Corridor: The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is the 7,200-km multi-modal route connecting India with Russia and Europe via Iran, using the ports of Mumbai and Bandar Abbas with rail and road links through Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Conceived in the 2000 India-Iran-Russia agreement and operationalised through trial shipments, it bypasses the Suez Canal. For UPSC, it is India's answer to Eurasian connectivity constraints. Chabahar port is integrated into the corridor as India's gateway to Iran.
  • TAPI: TAPI is the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline, designed to carry gas from Turkmenistan's Galkynysh field to Fazilka in Punjab, India. Conceived to diversify India's energy imports and anchor regional cooperation, it has been repeatedly delayed by security and financing concerns in Afghanistan and Pakistan. For UPSC it is the flagship example of energy diplomacy and cross-border infrastructure. The 2015 groundbreaking of the Turkmen section of the pipeline at Mary in Turkmenistan.
  • Belt and Road Initiative: The Belt and Road Initiative is China's transcontinental infrastructure programme launched by Xi Jinping in 2013, combining the Silk Road Economic Belt across Eurasia with a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road through the Indian Ocean. It finances ports, railways, and energy projects in partner countries, drawing criticism over debt sustainability and strategic leverage. For UPSC IR, it is the framework behind China's Indian Ocean presence and India's refusal to join. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the BRI's flagship corridor linking Gwadar port to Kashgar
  • CPEC: The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is the flagship corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative, linking Gwadar port in Balochistan to Kashgar in Xinjiang through energy, road, rail, and special economic zone projects. It traverses Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which is why India opposes it on sovereignty grounds. For UPSC, CPEC illustrates the BRI's strategic geography and India's concerns over the China-Pakistan axis. India's consistent diplomatic objection to CPEC on the ground that it passes through territory India claims in Jammu and Kashmir
  • Global South: Global South is the term for the developing and emerging economies of Asia, Africa and Latin America, defined by shared development challenges rather than geography. It denotes a political identity: demand for a fairer voice in global governance, climate finance and trade rules. For UPSC, it is essential GS-2 vocabulary for India's leadership pitch, from G20 presidency outreach to development partnerships framed as South-South cooperation. The Voice of Global South Summits hosted by India in 2023 during its G20 presidency.
  • Multi-alignment: Multi-alignment is India's contemporary foreign-policy approach of engaging several major powers simultaneously, issue by issue, instead of joining any single bloc. It is the post-Cold War successor to non-alignment: India deepens defence ties with the US, energy ties with Russia and regional ties with Japan and Australia, all at once. For UPSC, multi-alignment is the GS-2 answer to how New Delhi navigates US-China rivalry while preserving strategic autonomy. India participating in the Quad with the US, Japan and Australia while remaining active in the SCO and BRICS with Russia and China.
  • Tianjin Declaration: Outcome document of the 25th SCO Summit (2025), condemning the Pahalgam terror attack and adopting an AI cooperation roadmap.
  • Global Governance Initiative: China's 2025 proposal for a more just and equitable global governance system, included in the Tianjin Declaration.
  • SCO Development Bank: Proposed bank to fund regional connectivity and development projects, mooted at the 2025 Tianjin summit.
  • Civilizational Dialogue Forum: India's proposal at Tianjin 2025 to counter radicalisation through cultural and civilizational exchange.

Practice questions

0 of 5 answered · 0 correct

Q1Prelims practice

Consider the following statements about the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation:

  1. The SCO was founded in 2001 as the successor to the Shanghai Five.
  2. India and Pakistan became full members of the SCO in 2017.
  3. The SCO Charter was signed in 2002.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

Q2Prelims practice

The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) of the SCO is headquartered in:

Q3Prelims practice

Which of the following countries became SCO members AFTER India’s admission in 2017?

Q4Prelims practice

India’s refusal to endorse BRI-related language in SCO declarations is primarily based on:

Q5Prelims practice

Which one of the following best captures India’s approach to simultaneous membership of the SCO and the Quad?

Mains Practice question

Q. “The SCO’s functioning is affected by a ‘virus of conflict’ among its members.” In this light, examine the aims and objectives of the SCO and the importance it holds for India. (250 words)

Framing hintBegin with the aims: the three evils, mutual trust, economic cooperation, multipolar order. Then diagnose the virus: India-China border tensions, India-Pakistan hostility spilling into declarations and RATS, China’s dominance of the agenda. Assess India’s mitigation role: BRI non-endorsement, using RATS language against terror sponsors, summit-sideline diplomacy. Conclude with the cost-benefit verdict: constrained but irreplaceable Eurasian access.

Related GS-II themes from the PYQ bank: the aims and objectives of the SCO and its importance for India; the role of India in mitigating the organisation’s internal conflicts.

Frequently asked questions

What is the SCO?

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, founded in 2001 by China, Russia and four Central Asian states as the successor to the Shanghai Five (1996). It is a ten-member Eurasian forum for political, economic and security cooperation.

When did India join the SCO?

India became a full member in 2017, together with Pakistan. Iran joined in 2023 and Belarus in 2024.

What is RATS?

The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, the SCO’s permanent counter-terrorism body based in Tashkent. It coordinates intelligence sharing, joint exercises and action against terrorism, separatism and extremism.

Why does India stay in a China-dominated forum?

Because it is the only multilateral table seating India with all Central Asian states: it gives counter-terrorism coordination, energy and connectivity stakes, and neutral summit sidelines for engaging China and Pakistan. Absence would cost more than frustration.

How does India balance the SCO with the Quad?

Functionally: the SCO serves Eurasian security and Central Asia interests, the Quad serves Indo-Pacific and technology interests. India refuses exclusivity, for instance by withholding BRI endorsement at SCO summits while deepening Quad maritime cooperation.

The 26th summit: the Bishkek Declaration

The 26th summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation met in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, from 31 August to 1 September 2026, marking twenty-five years of the grouping under the theme of together for sustainable peace, development and prosperity. It closed with the Bishkek Declaration and twenty-seven accompanying cooperation documents.

Outcome

What was decided

Counter-terrorism

Rejected double standards in fighting terrorism and called for action against terrorism, separatism, extremism and the cross-border movement of terrorists.

West Asia

Condemned military strikes on Iran and called for the conflict to be settled through political and diplomatic means.

Working language

Amended the SCO Charter to add English as an official and working language, alongside Russian and Chinese.

New security bodies

Approved provisions for a Universal Centre for Countering Challenges and Threats to the Security of SCO Member States and an SCO Anti-Drug Centre.

India's initiatives

Welcomed the proposed SCO Civilisation Dialogue Forum in India, plus youth cooperation through the Young Scientists Forum and the Young Authors Conference.

Next chair

Pakistan assumed the SCO chairmanship for 2026-27 and will host the next Council of Heads of State summit in 2027.

25th Meeting of the Council of Heads of Government (CHG) of the SCO

On 20 October 2026, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh addressed the 25th Council of Heads of Government (CHG) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. The 26th heads-of-state summit had been held in Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic, on 31 August–1 September 2026, attended by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, where leaders adopted the Bishkek Declaration and approved 28 documents on security, emergencies, climate, energy and institutions. The SCO originated in the Shanghai Five of 1996, was established on 15 June 2001, has ten full members — India and Pakistan joined in 2017, Iran in 2023, Belarus in 2024 — and its secretariat is in Beijing. Its members cover about 36 million square kilometres and number over 3.4 billion people, accounting for about a fourth of global GDP and over 15 per cent of international trade. At Bishkek, India called for dismantling the terrorist ecosystem, opposed double standards in counter-terrorism, linked Eurasian security with peace in Afghanistan, backed connectivity respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, and supported English as an official SCO language. India also announced it would host the first SCO Civilisation Dialogue Forum later in 2026, backing the Young Scientists Forum, the Young Authors' Conclave and youth cooperation. For prelims, the date, venue, minister and the SCO's membership and scale are the recall facts; for mains, the meeting shows India working inside a grouping including China, Russia, Pakistan and Iran, using it for counter-terrorism, connectivity and cultural outreach while keeping bilateral differences outside the room.

IRSCOupsc-prelimsgs-paper-2GS2 19explained

Asked in the mains

Previous-year questions from this topic

How UPSC has actually asked this topic — with the year and marks for each question.

  1. 202310 marks

    ‘Virus of Conflict' is affecting the functioning of the SCO. In light of the above statement, point out the role of India in mitigating problems.

  2. 202410 marks

    Critically analyse India's evolving diplomatic, economic and strategic relations with the Central Asian Republics (CARs), highlighting their increasing significance in regional and global geopolitics.

  3. 201810 marks

    A number of outside powers have entrenched themselves in Central Asia, which is a zone of interest to India. Discuss the implications, in this context, of India’s joining the Ashgabat Agreement, 2018.

  4. 202115 marks

    Critically examine the aims and objectives of SCO. What importance does it hold for India?

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