The SCO: India's Eurasian balancing act

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is the Eurasian forum India once watched from the outside and then decided it could not afford to miss. Founded in 2001 by China, Russia and four Central Asian states as the successor to the Shanghai Five, the SCO combines counter-terrorism, economic cooperation and a vision of a multipolar order. India became a full member in 2017, alongside Pakistan, and has since used the platform for Central Asia access, counter-terrorism coordination and rare diplomatic face-time with rivals.

For UPSC, the SCO is the mirror image of the Quad question: if the Quad is India’s Indo-Pacific bet with the West, the SCO is its Eurasian hedge with China and Russia in the room. This article covers the origins, what India gains, the China-Pakistan constraints, and how Delhi balances SCO membership with its other coalitions.

Origins: from the Shanghai Five to a ten-member forum

The SCO’s roots are in border demilitarisation: the Shanghai Five, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, formed in 1996 to settle post-Soviet boundary questions, with Uzbekistan joining to create the SCO in 2001. The Charter, signed in 2002 and in force from 2003, set the organisation’s aims: mutual trust, countering terrorism, separatism and extremism, and economic cooperation. Expansion came in waves: India and Pakistan in 2017, Iran in 2023, Belarus in 2024, with observer states and dialogue partners extending its reach further.

The structure is intergovernmental and consensus-based. The Heads of State Council is the supreme body, meeting at annual summits; the Secretariat sits in Beijing; and RATS, based in Tashkent, coordinates counter-terrorism through intelligence sharing, joint exercises and a common database of extremist organisations.

Why India joined

Three motives drove the 2017 decision. First, geography: the SCO is the only multilateral table where India sits with all five Central Asian republics, the region of its Connect Central Asia policy, uranium and hydrocarbon stakes, and the Afghanistan question. Second, security: RATS gives India a formal channel on terrorism, extremism, narcotics and intelligence sharing in a region where Pakistan-based groups operate. Third, diplomacy: the summit sidelines are one of the few neutral venues where Indian leaders meet Chinese and Pakistani counterparts, as at the reported 2025 Tianjin meeting where border and trade issues were discussed.

Prime Minister Modi’s 2022 Samarkand line, "today’s era is not an era of war," delivered on SCO soil, captured the posture Delhi wants: present in Eurasian security conversations, but as a voice for dialogue rather than confrontation.

What India actually gains

On counter-terrorism, RATS coordination has given India a multilateral hook for its core concern: at the reported 44th RATS Council meeting in 2025, India pressed for action against the sponsors, financiers and perpetrators of the Pahalgam terror attack, using the forum’s own language against Pakistan. On connectivity, SCO declarations have acknowledged the International North-South Transport Corridor, and the forum keeps the TAPI pipeline and Central Asian uranium cooperation on the diplomatic agenda. On energy, discussions within the SCO framework cover Turkmen gas and Central Asian hydrocarbons that India cannot easily reach bilaterally.

The diplomatic dividend is quieter but real. The SCO gives India a standing invitation to Eurasian security talks it would otherwise watch from outside, and a platform for initiatives like the SCO Startup Forum launched in 2021. For an aspirant to a larger global role, absence from the table would cost more than the frustrations of sitting at it.

The China-Pakistan problem

The constraints are as structural as the gains. China’s push to steer the SCO, including promoting the Belt and Road Initiative through its declarations, risks turning the forum into a China-centric platform; India’s response has been to withhold endorsement of BRI language on sovereignty grounds, as it did at the 2023 summit over CPEC’s passage through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Pakistan, meanwhile, has repeatedly raised Kashmir in SCO settings, and at the reported 2025 defence ministers’ meeting India publicly held Pakistan responsible as a supporter of terrorism.

The economic payoff is thin. Logistical barriers and the absence of direct land access, Pakistan denies India transit to Central Asia, mean India-SCO trade is dwarfed by China-SCO trade, reported at over US$500 billion in 2024. And the balancing act with the Quad is constant: Delhi skipped the 2024 Astana summit while engaging Quad partners, a signal Beijing read as deliberate. The SCO does not replace anything; it adds a constrained but useful Eurasian channel.

Balancing the SCO with the Quad and BRICS

India’s standard defence of dual membership is functional: the Quad serves Indo-Pacific and technology interests, BRICS serves development finance and Global South voice, and the SCO serves Eurasian security and Central Asia access. No single forum gets exclusivity, which is the working definition of multi-alignment. The test cases are instructive: India can discuss LAC disengagement with China on SCO sidelines in one month and coordinate maritime domain awareness with Quad partners the next, without either engagement cancelling the other.

What examiners keep asking

• The aims-and-objectives answer runs: counter the "three evils" (terrorism, separatism, extremism), build mutual trust, deepen economic cooperation, and promote a multipolar order.
• India’s importance-to-SCO and SCO’s importance-to-India are two different questions; answer the one asked.
• The "virus of conflict" framing is the standard way to discuss how bilateral disputes infect multilateral forums, with India’s mitigation role as the follow-up.

Tianjin 2025: the silver jubilee summit

The 25th SCO Summit, held in Tianjin on 31 August-1 September 2025, was the largest in the organisation's history and its silver-jubilee edition. The theme, "Advancing the Shanghai Spirit: SCO in Action", framed the Tianjin Declaration, which covered security, connectivity, trade, energy and cultural cooperation. The declaration condemned the Pahalgam terror attack, a significant line for India, and members adopted an AI cooperation roadmap alongside statements on energy and multilateralism.

Prime Minister Modi articulated India's approach through three pillars: security, connectivity and opportunity. On security, he pressed for united action against terrorism, radicalisation and extremism, and proposed a Civilizational Dialogue Forum to counter radicalisation through cultural exchange. On connectivity, India reaffirmed support for the Chabahar port and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), insisting that connectivity initiatives respect sovereignty and territorial integrity. On opportunity, he backed cooperation in startups, innovation and traditional medicine.

The summit's big structural moves came from China. President Xi Jinping proposed the Global Governance Initiative (GGI), calling for a more just and equitable global governance system, and the idea found a place in the Tianjin Declaration. Leaders proposed an SCO Development Bank to fund regional projects, accepted Laos as a dialogue partner (taking the SCO family to 10 members plus 17 partners, 27 in all), and confirmed Kyrgyzstan as chair for 2025-26. China pledged RMB 2 billion in grants, 100 "Small and Beautiful" livelihood projects and more Luban Workshops for vocational training. The members also adopted the SCO Anti-Drug Strategy for 2024-2029, giving the RATS counter-terror architecture a narcotics counterpart.

For UPSC, Tianjin 2025 is the summit to quote: it shows the SCO as the one Eurasian table where India and China still negotiate in the same room, and India's three-pillar framing gives a ready-made structure for any mains answer on India's Eurasian strategy.

Key Terms

• International North-South Transport Corridor: The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is the 7,200-km multi-modal route connecting India with Russia and Europe via Iran, using the ports of Mumbai and Bandar Abbas with rail and road links through Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Conceived in the 2000 India-Iran-Russia agreement and operationalised through trial shipments, it bypasses the Suez Canal. For UPSC, it is India's answer to Eurasian connectivity constraints. Chabahar port is integrated into the corridor as India's gateway to Iran.
• Connect Central Asia policy: The Connect Central Asia Policy, unveiled in June 2012 at the first India-Central Asia Dialogue in Bishkek, is India's framework for engaging the five Central Asian republics. It covers political ties, trade, energy security, counter-terrorism, and connectivity through the INSTC and Chabahar port. For UPSC, it marks India's extended-neighbourhood outreach to an energy-rich region where China and Russia compete for influence. The first India-Central Asia Summit, held virtually in January 2022, institutionalised the engagement at the leaders' level.
• Belt and Road Initiative: The Belt and Road Initiative is China's transcontinental infrastructure programme launched by Xi Jinping in 2013, combining the Silk Road Economic Belt across Eurasia with a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road through the Indian Ocean. It finances ports, railways, and energy projects in partner countries, drawing criticism over debt sustainability and strategic leverage. For UPSC IR, it is the framework behind China's Indian Ocean presence and India's refusal to join. the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the BRI's flagship corridor linking Gwadar port to Kashgar
• Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is a Eurasian intergovernmental body founded in 2001 in Shanghai by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with India and Pakistan joining as full members in 2017. It coordinates on counterterrorism (through RATS), security, and economic connectivity. For UPSC it is central to India's multi-alignment: a platform where India engages China and Russia while balancing its Quad and Western partnerships. India chaired the SCO and hosted its 2023 summit in virtual format.
• Civilizational Dialogue Forum: India's proposal at Tianjin 2025 to counter radicalisation through cultural and civilizational exchange.
• Global Governance Initiative: China's 2025 proposal for a more just and equitable global governance system, included in the Tianjin Declaration.
• SCO Development Bank: Proposed bank to fund regional connectivity and development projects, mooted at the 2025 Tianjin summit.
• Tianjin Declaration: Outcome document of the 25th SCO Summit (2025), condemning the Pahalgam terror attack and adopting an AI cooperation roadmap.
• Global South: Global South is the term for the developing and emerging economies of Asia, Africa and Latin America, defined by shared development challenges rather than geography. It denotes a political identity: demand for a fairer voice in global governance, climate finance and trade rules. For UPSC, it is essential GS-2 vocabulary for India's leadership pitch, from G20 presidency outreach to development partnerships framed as South-South cooperation. The Voice of Global South Summits hosted by India in 2023 during its G20 presidency.
• multi-alignment: Multi-alignment is India's contemporary foreign-policy approach of engaging several major powers simultaneously, issue by issue, instead of joining any single bloc. It is the post-Cold War successor to non-alignment: India deepens defence ties with the US, energy ties with Russia and regional ties with Japan and Australia, all at once. For UPSC, multi-alignment is the GS-2 answer to how New Delhi navigates US-China rivalry while preserving strategic autonomy. India participating in the Quad with the US, Japan and Australia while remaining active in the SCO and BRICS with Russia and China.
• Indo-Pacific: Indo-Pacific is the geopolitical construct spanning the Indian and Pacific Oceans, from East Africa to the western Pacific. It frames the region as one interconnected strategic space centred on open sea lanes, freedom of navigation and a rules-based maritime order, with ASEAN centrality as its diplomatic anchor. For UPSC, it is the core vocabulary of GS-2 foreign policy, underpinning India's Act East policy, Quad engagement and maritime security doctrine. India's Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, launched at the 2019 East Asia Summit to promote maritime cooperation.
• Pahalgam: Pahalgam is a tourist town in Jammu and Kashmir's Anantnag district, known for the Lidder river valley and as the base for the Amarnath Yatra. It entered national security discourse after the 22 April 2025 terror attack in the nearby Baisaran valley, in which 26 civilians were killed. For UPSC, Pahalgam is the trigger event for Operation Sindoor and the 2025 to 2026 debate on cross-border terrorism. India's Operation Sindoor of May 2025, striking terror camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, was launched in response to the attack.

Practice questions