Electoral systems and reforms: FPTP vs PR, delimitation and the reform library

India elects its Lok Sabha by a system in which the candidate with the most votes wins, even without a majority, while it elects its President by a system in which votes are transferred until someone crosses a quota. Both methods live in the same Constitution, and the choice between them shapes everything from party systems to government stability. Around the method sits delimitation, which draws constituencies, and a fifty-year library of reform committee reports. This article explains both voting systems, the frozen delimitation, and the proposed reforms.

FPTP versus proportional representation: two ways of turning votes into seats

First-past-the-post is brutally simple: the country is divided into single-member territorial constituencies, each voter casts one vote, and the candidate with the most votes wins, even with far less than half the votes. India uses it for direct elections to the Lok Sabha under Article 81 and to state assemblies under Article 170. Its virtues are simplicity, stable majorities and a clear representative link; its vice is disproportionality, with votes wasted on losers and seat shares diverging sharply from vote shares.

Proportional representation tries to match seats to vote shares. The Constitution uses one variant, the single transferable vote, for indirect elections: the President under Article 55, the Vice-President under Article 66, Rajya Sabha members under Article 80(4), and Legislative Council members under Article 171(4). Voters rank candidates, and surplus votes transfer until quotas are filled. It is fair to small parties but can fragment legislatures and weaken the voter link, which is why the framers confined it to indirect elections.

Delimitation: drawing the map, freezing the numbers

Delimitation is the redrawing of constituency boundaries to reflect population changes, done by an independent Delimitation Commission under Acts of Parliament. India has had four: in 1952, 1963, 1973 and 2002, under the Delimitation Commission Acts of 1952, 1962, 1972 and 2002. Each Commission is chaired by a retired Supreme Court judge and includes the Chief Election Commissioner and the State Election Commissioners of the states concerned, appointed by the President; its orders have the force of law and cannot be challenged in any court. Articles 82 and 170 require readjustment after each census.

The freeze is the twist. The 42nd Amendment of 1976 froze the allocation of Lok Sabha seats to states and the division of states into constituencies at 1971 census figures until 2001, to avoid penalising states that controlled population growth. The 84th Amendment of 2001 extended the freeze to 2026, meaning the next delimitation will use the first census after 2026. The 87th Amendment of 2003 separately rationalised constituency boundaries within states on the basis of the 2001 census without changing seat numbers. The coming delimitation is politically loaded: the freeze has already stretched the one person, one vote, one value principle, with a Uttar Pradesh MP representing several times the population of a Kerala MP, and southern states that controlled population growth fear losing relative representation, making it as much about federal fairness as arithmetic.

The reformers' library: Tarkunde, Goswami, Indrajit Gupta

Three committees anchor the electoral reform syllabus. The Tarkunde Committee (1974-75), a citizens' committee on electoral reforms, recommended insulating the Election Commission's appointment from executive monopoly and curbing the misuse of official machinery and money power. The Dinesh Goswami Committee of 1990, appointed by the National Front government, made wide-ranging proposals: state funding of elections, giving statutory backing to the Model Code of Conduct, disqualification for booth capturing and for conviction, and curbs on the misuse of government media and machinery.

The Indrajit Gupta Committee of 1998 examined state funding of elections and recommended partial state funding in kind, not cash, to recognised national and state parties: free airtime on public broadcasters, free supply of electoral rolls, and subsidised facilities, while banning or capping corporate donations. The government never implemented it, but the report remains the standard citation for the state-funding debate. The Law Commission's 255th Report of 2015 added a modern layer: making paid news an electoral offence, strengthening candidate disclosure, and tightening disqualification law. Two more reports belong in the library: the Vohra Committee of 1993, which exposed the nexus between crime and politics and recommended disqualification for candidates with criminal backgrounds, and the Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy Committee of 2004, which reviewed electoral law comprehensively and recommended curbing appeals to caste and religion and tightening the corrupt practices chapter.

What the Election Commission asked for in 2016

In 2016 the Election Commission sent the government 47 reform proposals, several of which UPSC has directly examined. The headline demands: the power to deregister political parties that never contest elections, treating paid news as a corrupt practice under Section 123 of the RPA, increasing the punishment for false affidavits under Section 125A from six months to two years so that it triggers disqualification, and introducing totaliser machines that mix votes from multiple booths before counting to protect voter secrecy in small booths.

Other proposals included a two-year cooling-off period before retired Election Commissioners accept government office, giving the Model Code of Conduct statutory backing on the lines suggested by the parliamentary Standing Committee in 2013, and a permanent election tribunal to decide election petitions within six months. Most proposals remain pending, which is itself an examinable fact: the Commission proposes, the government disposes.

The 2023 law on appointing the Election Commission

The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 replaced the 1991 Act and finally put the appointment process in statute. The trigger was Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023), in which the Supreme Court, noting the executive's monopoly over appointments, directed that until Parliament legislated, the CEC and Election Commissioners be chosen by a committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and the Chief Justice of India.

Parliament's version drops the Chief Justice. A Search Committee headed by the Cabinet Secretary with two Secretary-rank members prepares a panel of five; a Selection Committee of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition (or the largest opposition party's leader) and a Union Minister nominated by the Prime Minister then recommends names to the President. Candidates must be persons of integrity with election-management experience who have held a post equivalent to Secretary to the Government of India. The term is six years or until age 65, whichever is earlier, with no re-appointment; the salary is now equivalent to the Cabinet Secretary's, down from Supreme Court judge parity under the 1991 Act. Removal protection is unchanged: the CEC can be removed only like a Supreme Court judge, and an Election Commissioner only on the CEC's recommendation. In T.N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995) the Court had already held that the CEC and the Election Commissioners enjoy equal powers in decision-making.

Simultaneous elections: the one nation one election debate

India held simultaneous Lok Sabha and assembly elections until 1967, when early dissolutions broke the cycle. The High Level Committee on Simultaneous Elections, chaired by former President Ram Nath Kovind and constituted in September 2023, reported in March 2024 recommending a phased return: first align Lok Sabha and assembly elections, then hold local body elections within a hundred days. The mechanism requires constitutional amendments to fix tenures and handle hung houses, notably an appointed date after which assemblies elected mid-cycle serve only the remainder of the term.

In December 2024 the government introduced the Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill and the Union Territories Laws (Amendment) Bill, now before a Joint Parliamentary Committee. Supporters cite the costs of perpetual elections: the Model Code of Conduct repeatedly freezing governance, the deployment of security forces, and campaign expenditure. Critics warn that simultaneity nationalises every election, drowning state issues in the Lok Sabha's shadow, and that it strains federalism by curtailing the life of elected assemblies. UPSC asked about this directly in the 2024 mains.

The RPA of 1951: the statute that runs the election

The Representation of the People Act of 1951 is the working manual of Indian elections, and a handful of its sections carry the whole chapter. Section 8 disqualifies a person convicted and sentenced to two or more years' imprisonment for six years after release; Section 8(4), which gave sitting legislators three months to appeal, was struck down in Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2013), so disqualification is now immediate on conviction. Section 8A covers disqualification for corrupt practices, Section 10A for failure to lodge election expenses, and Section 29A governs registration of political parties.

Section 123 lists corrupt practices, including bribery, undue influence and appeals to religion, race, caste or community; in Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (2017) the Court held that an appeal to the religion or caste of either the candidate or the voter is a corrupt practice. Disclosure law rests on Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (2002), which required candidates to declare criminal, financial and educational backgrounds. PUCL v. Union of India (2013) introduced the NOTA option, Subramanian Swamy v. ECI (2013) brought VVPAT machines, and Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (2024) unanimously struck down the electoral bond scheme for violating the voters' right to information under Article 19(1)(a). Three more judgments complete the picture: Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006) upheld the open ballot system for Rajya Sabha elections; Jan Chaukidar (2014) barred persons in lawful custody from contesting elections; and Union of India v. Harbans Singh (2001) confirmed that the Election Commission can cancel polls in cases of booth capturing.

The trust machines: EVM and VVPAT

The Electronic Voting Machine entered the statute in 1988, when Parliament inserted Section 61A into the Representation of the People Act, 1951, allowing voting by machine. The Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) followed as the trust layer: a slip the voter sees for seven seconds before it drops into a sealed box, creating a paper trail for every electronic vote. In Subramanian Swamy (2013) the Supreme Court directed the phased introduction of VVPAT, holding that free and fair elections are part of the basic structure and paper verification strengthens them.

The current settlement is administrative, not statutory. Since 2019 the Election Commission verifies VVPAT slips from five EVMs per assembly segment, chosen at random. In April 2024 the Supreme Court upheld the EVM-VVPAT system and declined to expand verification to every machine or to return to paper ballots, while directing safeguards such as symbol loading units being sealed and stored for 45 days. The exam takeaway: EVMs are statutory (Section 61A), VVPAT verification ratios are administrative (ECI instructions tested and upheld in court).

NOTA: the right to reject, and its limits

In PUCL (2013) the Supreme Court directed the None of the Above (NOTA) option on EVMs, holding that the right to vote includes the right not to vote for any candidate, and that secrecy must protect the abstainer as much as the voter. NOTA's electoral effect is limited: even where NOTA polls the most votes, the candidate with the highest vote total wins, a rule the Indore 2024 result, where NOTA crossed two lakh votes yet the seat was decided among candidates, demonstrated at scale. The live debate is whether NOTA should acquire teeth, such as voiding the election where it tops the poll, a reform the courts have so far left to Parliament.

The Model Code: born in Kerala, 1960

The Model Code of Conduct began as a voluntary agreement between parties in Kerala's 1960 assembly elections, not as a statute. The Election Commission adopted it, extended it to all elections, and enforces it from the announcement of the schedule to the declaration of results. Its authority rests on a mix of moral sanction and statutory hooks: many MCC violations map onto offences under the RPA, 1951 and the Indian Penal Code, but the Code itself has never been given full statutory backing, which is why every reform commission since has recommended legal status for it without success.

Prelims hooks

• FPTP: Lok Sabha (Article 81) and assemblies (Article 170); most votes wins, no majority needed. PR by single transferable vote: President (55), Vice-President (66), Rajya Sabha (80(4)), Legislative Councils (171(4)).
• Delimitation Commissions: 1952, 1963, 1973, 2002. 42nd Amendment froze seats till 2001; 84th Amendment extended the freeze to 2026; 87th Amendment (2003) rationalised boundaries on 2001 census figures.
• Tarkunde (1974-75): ECI appointment insulation, misuse of machinery. Dinesh Goswami (1990): state funding, MCC, booth capturing. Indrajit Gupta (1998): partial state funding in kind. Vohra (1993): crime-politics nexus, disqualification for criminal backgrounds. Jeevan Reddy (2004): electoral-law review. Law Commission 255th Report (2015): paid news, disclosure.
• Delimitation Commission: retired SC judge as chair, CEC plus State ECs as members, appointed by the President; orders have the force of law, cannot be challenged; one person, one vote, one value stretched (UP vs Kerala MP populations).
• CEC Act 2023: replaces the 1991 Act; Anoop Baranwal (2023) trigger; Search Committee headed by Cabinet Secretary (panel of five); Selection Committee of PM, LoP and a Union Minister; eligibility Secretary-to-GoI level with election experience; term 6 years or 65; salary now Cabinet Secretary level.
• Removal: CEC like an SC judge, ECs only on the CEC's recommendation; T.N. Seshan (1995): CEC and ECs have equal powers.
• Kuldip Nayar (2006): open ballot for Rajya Sabha upheld. Jan Chaukidar (2014): custody bar on contesting. UOI v Harbans Singh (2001): ECI can cancel polls for booth capturing.
• ECI 2016 proposals: deregister parties, paid news as corrupt practice, false affidavit punishment to two years, totaliser machines.
• RPA 1951: Section 8 (conviction disqualification), 8A (corrupt practices), 10A (expenses), 29A (party registration), 123 (corrupt practices), 125A (false affidavit).
• Lily Thomas (2013): Section 8(4) struck down, immediate disqualification. ADR (2002): candidate disclosure. PUCL (2013): NOTA. Abhiram Singh (2017): religion and caste appeals. Electoral bonds struck down (2024).
• Simultaneous elections: Kovind Committee (2023 to 2024), Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill 2024, JPC reference.

Mains angle

A GS-2 answer on electoral reforms should move from system to statute to committee. Open with the FPTP versus PR choice and why the framers split it between direct and indirect elections, then show how delimitation's freeze has stored up a federal problem for the post-2026 exercise. The committee library is the analytical core: Tarkunde, Goswami, Indrajit Gupta and the Law Commission diagnosed money power, criminalisation and institutional weakness decades ago, yet most recommendations remain unimplemented.

Evaluate simultaneous elections as the live controversy, weighing governance continuity against federalism and the nationalisation of state contests. Close with the RPA's judicial evolution: Lily Thomas, ADR disclosure and the electoral bonds judgment show the Court repeatedly doing what the legislature would not. The 2024 mains question on committee recommendations and one nation one election rewards exactly this layered structure.

Key Terms

• Section 8(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951: Section 8(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 gave convicted MPs and MLAs a three-month window to appeal before disqualification took effect, shielding sitting legislators from immediate disqualification. The Supreme Court struck it down in Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2013), making disqualification immediate on conviction for offences listed in Section 8. For UPSC, it is a landmark GS-2 point on decriminalisation of politics and electoral reform. Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2013)
• Secretary to the Government of India: The Secretary to the Government of India is the administrative head of a ministry or department and the highest civil-service rank within it, usually held by a senior IAS officer. The Secretary advises the minister, signs off on policy and financial proposals, and represents the ministry before parliamentary committees. For UPSC, the post is key to GS-2 questions on the political executive, civil services accountability and minister-secretary relations. The Union Home Secretary
• Lily Thomas v. Union of India: Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2013) is the Supreme Court decision, delivered by a bench of Justices A.K. Patnaik and S.J. Mukhopadhaya, that invalidated Section 8(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The case arose from a PIL by advocate Lily Thomas challenging the grace period for convicted lawmakers. By making disqualification immediate on conviction, it closed a loophole that had protected tainted legislators, and it remains the leading case on Section 8 disqualification for UPSC. the Court held the ruling prospective, sparing lawmakers already convicted with pending appeals before 10 July 2013
• the Leader of the Opposition: The Leader of the Opposition is the head of the largest opposition party in each House of Parliament, accorded statutory recognition and the rank and salary of a Cabinet minister under the 1977 Leaders of Opposition Act. By convention the party should hold at least one-tenth of the House's strength. The office anchors bipartisan oversight of key appointments. Example: the Leader of the Opposition sits on the selection committees for the CBI Director and the Central Vigilance Commissioner. The Leader of the Opposition's membership of the selection committees for the CBI Director and the Central Vigilance Commissioner.
• Model Code of Conduct: The Model Code of Conduct is a set of guidelines issued by the Election Commission of India to regulate the behaviour of political parties and candidates during elections, covering speeches, polling-day conduct, use of official machinery and announcements of new schemes. It comes into force from the announcement of the election schedule until results are declared. It matters for UPSC because its constitutional basis, enforceability and relation to free and fair elections are frequently asked in prelims and GS-2 mains. The Election Commission's enforcement of the code during the 2024 Lok Sabha general elections
• Joint Parliamentary Committee: A Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) is the most prominent ad hoc parliamentary committee, with members from both Houses set up to inquire into specific issues of public importance. It matters for UPSC as the legislature's heavyweight accountability instrument, though its recommendations are not binding. The JPC that probed the 2G spectrum allocation, one of several high-profile JPCs alongside those on Bofors and the VVIP chopper deal.
• Dinesh Goswami Committee: The Dinesh Goswami Committee was the 1990 committee on electoral reforms headed by former Law Minister Dinesh Goswami. It recommended state funding of elections, a ban on company donations to political parties, stricter anti-defection provisions, and curbs on misuse of official machinery during polls. Example: its state-funding proposal resurfaces in every debate on electoral bonds and campaign finance. UPSC relevance: the standard reference point for electoral reform in GS Paper 2. UPSC answers on electoral reform routinely begin with the Goswami Committee's call for state funding of elections.
• Indrajit Gupta Committee: The Indrajit Gupta Committee (1998), headed by CPI leader Indrajit Gupta, examined electoral reforms and recommended partial state funding of elections for recognised national and state parties, in kind, such as free time on electronic media. It matters for UPSC as the standard citation in mains answers on curbing money power in politics. Its state-funding proposal resurfacing in debates on electoral bonds and campaign-finance reform.
• Jeevan Reddy Committee: The Jeevan Reddy Committee, headed by Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy and set up in 2005, reviewed the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act and recommended repealing it, replacing it with a new law incorporating the Act's essential provisions. It matters for UPSC as the authoritative citation in the AFSPA debate between security imperatives and human rights. Its repeal recommendation invoked in every parliamentary and judicial discussion of AFSPA since.
• The Tarkunde Committee: The Tarkunde Committee (1974), a citizens' committee on electoral reforms under jurist V.M. Tarkunde constituted during the JP movement, recommended a multi-member Election Commission, curbs on money and muscle power, and state funding of elections. Though unofficial, its proposals shaped the reform agenda for decades. its demand for a multi-member Election Commission was realised in 1993
• Electoral Bond Scheme: The Electoral Bond Scheme was a 2017 scheme letting individuals and companies buy interest-free bearer bonds from the State Bank of India and donate them anonymously to political parties. It was meant to bring transparency to political funding but was criticised for anonymous corporate influence. The Supreme Court struck it down as unconstitutional on 15 February 2024, ruling that it violated the right to information. For UPSC, it matters centrally in GS-2 questions on electoral reform and democratic accountability. Following the Court's judgment, the State Bank of India was ordered to disclose bond purchase details to the Election Commission of India.
• The Vohra Committee: The Vohra Committee is the 1993 panel headed by then Home Secretary N. N. Vohra that reported on the nexus between crime syndicates, politicians and bureaucrats in India. It warned of a parallel government run by musclemen with political patronage, eroding the rule of law. For UPSC, it is the foundational reference in GS-2 and GS-4 answers on criminalisation of politics, electoral reform and ethics in public life. Vohra Committee report, 1993

Practice questions